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The Editors: America Held Hostage Again

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JUL 9 - 1985

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A History of Sex

by Laurence Stone

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NEWSPAPER

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THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO TAX PEOPLE WHO BUY LIFE INSURANCE WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE FINANCIAL SECURITY OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS.

IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, UNWISE AND COMPLEX.

Everyone wants a tax system that is simple and fair for all Americans. But proposals to tax life insurance policyholders are neither simple nor fair.

If the Administration's tax reform proposal were made law, all who purchase permanent life insurance would be forced to pay an income tax on the annual increase in the value of their policies. This would destroy a product that is important to the financial security of millions of Americans.

Why the tax would be wrong:

1. Permanent life insurance provides lifetime protection at a level cost, a cost that does not increase as the policyholder grows older. But, the Administration's proposal would destroy the level cost feature because the tax would increase each year until, for example, at age 60 a policyholder would pay a tax greater than the amount of the annual premium.

This is wrong. It would constitute the first age-indexed tax in the history of our nation.

2. The Administration claims that permanent life insurance is the equivalent of a savings account. Life insurance is not a savings account. The only way a policyholder can gain free access to a policy's cash value is by surrendering the policy.

3. Taxing the cash value of life insurance policies would completely reverse the tax concepts that have been upheld by the nation's courts over the past 70 years. It would be like having to pay an income tax on the increased value of a home without its being sold. Under the Administration's proposal, someone who purchases a $40,000 permanent life insurance policy at age 35 could pay $10,900 in new taxes in his lifetime!

4. Permanent life insurance is not a tax loophole for the rich. Of the over 70 million permanent life insurance policies now in force, 78 percent are owned by low- and middle-income people earning less than $25,000 annually. Why penalize them for trying to protect their families?

5. The American people oppose the taxation of life insurance. In a 1985 national survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 83 percent of the respondents said that a tax on permanent life insurance would make the product less desirable. In other words, taxation would discourage Americans from using life insurance, which is the only guaranteed financial protection for their families in the event of the death of the breadwinner.

6. A tax on life insurance policies would not raise additional federal revenue for many years.

7. As the demand for permanent life insurance died out, serious damage would be done to the life insurance industry, which is a major source of long-term investment capital. As of 1983, for example, the accumulated assets attributable to individual life insurance contracts amounted to $150 billion. This is money that is invested in America, money that creates new jobs, builds new factories, and in countless other ways supports our nation's economic growth and vitality.

We respectfully ask that Members of Congress, in their deliberations, consider very carefully the consequences of such a tax. While producing essentially no revenue, it would seriously damage an important industry and destroy a product on which many millions of Americans depend for their financial security. We earnestly believe that it makes no sense, either economically or socially.

American Council of Life Insurance
1850 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

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4 **TRB FROM WASHINGTON** ..... A TAX ON LIBERALS
The secret design of Reagan's reform.

6 **CORRESPONDENCE** ..... On Phyllis George, anti-apartheid protests, &c.

7 **THE EDITORS** ..... HERE WE GO AGAIN
America has learned nothing about combating terrorism. There are better ways.

NOTEBOOK
On the "Doonesbury" flap and the Rajiv mystique.

9 **FRED BARNES** ..... QUEEN JEANE
She's dazzling crowds and surprising friends. What Washington didn't know about Kirkpatrick.

11 **STEVEN E. MILLER** ..... SALT SHAKERS
The administration claims the Soviets are cheating. A close look at the compliance issue.

15 **NATHAN GLAZER** ..... NAZIS AND SOVIETS
All totalitarians are not alike. Here's why.

16 **ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI** ..... A STAR WARS SOLUTION
Reagan's idea is flawed, but the SDI holds promise for a real arms control agreement with the Soviets. Let's get on with it.

18 **P. J. CORKERY** ..... ADDICTION À L.A. MODE
Come to the Betty Ford Center in sunny Palm Springs, and kick your habit with the world's most famous drug addicts.

21 **JEFFREY SACHS** ..... ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC DISASTER
These fiscal woes—vast budget deficits, heavy military costs, and hyperinflation—make our own look puny. It's time for some stiff reforms.

24 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ..... ON FILMS: OLD HANDS
Satyajit Ray's *The Home and the World* is modest fare; *Prizzi's Honor* is not top Huston fun.

25 **LAWRENCE STONE** ..... SEX IN THE WEST
Our sex-obsessed society is strangely ignorant about the history of sex. There has never been "normal" sex. Herein the annals of the odd and complex moral, religious, and medical practices and prescriptions surrounding the dirty deed.

36 **DANIEL HALPERN** ..... POEM *Summer Nights*

37 **DANIEL PIPES** ..... SHIA STOOPS TO CONQUER
All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran by Gary Sick

American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis by Warren Christopher, Harold H. Saunders, et al.

41 **GARRETT EPPS** ..... INNOCENT ABROAD
Stars and Bars by William Boyd

43 **WASHINGTON DIARIST** ..... CONNIPTIONS

COVER by Allen Carroll for THE NEW REPUBLIC. Article on page 25.

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FROM WASHINGTON

A Tax On Liberals

What does a "liberal" look like? When conservative ideologues refer with contempt to this virtually extinct beast, they may well imagine a middle-income person with a working spouse, living in a Northeast industrial state or perhaps in California. As it happens, this is the one identifiable group of people—apart from outright exploiters of the current system—who would pay more taxes under President Reagan's tax-reform plan.

As a resident of a high-tax state, our typical liberal gets hit especially hard by the end of deductibility for state and local taxes. With both spouses working and the kids in day care, the liberal couple suffers twice. First, they lose the two-earner deduction designed to reduce the "marriage penalty" that results when two incomes join in holy wedlock and suddenly add up to a higher bracket. Second, the couple's child-care credit is turned into a deduction, which is less valuable for all but top-bracket taxpayers. Finally, just about the only new personal tax break to be added to the code does them no good: an increase from $2,250 to $4,000 in the maximum a one-earner couple can sock away, tax-free, in an IRA. This billion-dollar revenue loser helps only families that can save more than $2,250 a year even though one spouse isn't employed.

Although even tax-reform purists don't see the deduction for state and local taxes as an especially abusive form of special treatment, the Reagan administration is adamant that this is one reform it will not compromise on. One reason is money. Ending the deduction is expected to bring in $40 billion a year by 1990. This is more than half the $72 billion expected to be lost through reduction of individual tax rates. Ending the "marriage penalty deduction" is expected to bring in another nine billion dollars. These are by far the two biggest revenue raisers among all the proposed reforms of the individual income tax. In fact these two changes, along with an envisaged shift of $27 billion in taxes from individuals to corporations, add up to $76 billion: four billion dollars *more* than the cost of the proposed rate cut. These three changes are the essence of Reagan's reform of personal (nonbusiness) taxes. Everything else is trivia.

Is it fair? New York politicians and media are mounting a near-hysterical campaign against this aspect of Reagan's plan. SALARY PERIL was the headline over a typical recent story in *The New York Times*. On close inspection, though, the peril looks quite modest. According to the story, the median-income two-worker family of four in New York, making $35,160, would owe $3,044 in federal income tax under Reagan's plan, compared to $2,913 now. That's a perilous difference of $131. This couple currently deducts $3,640 in state and local taxes—more than its entire federal tax bill—thus supporting the White House contention that this deduction is a rather large subsidy of high-tax states. What's more, restoring the deduction would make the tax code less egalitarian, not more so. A typical $200,000-plus taxpayer deducts more than $20,000 in state and local taxes each year. A $30,000 to $50,000 taxpayer deducts about $2,000. Non-itemizers, generally lower-income, don't get to deduct anything.

Reagan fell into the demagogic error of billing tax reform as a tax cut for everyone except bad guys. This opened him up to the counter-demagoguery of New York governor Mario Cuomo, who declares that "the essential ingredient of true tax reform" is that "everyone benefits." In fact, there's no way to untangle a mess like the Internal Revenue Code and assure that all decent people end up better off. And we may well have arrived at terminal democratic gridlock if groups harmed to the tune of less than $150 are inspired and able to block a major reform.

But White House communications director Patrick Buchanan has now confirmed suspicions that simplifying the tax code was not the administration's only motive in these particular proposed changes. He has accused high-tax states like New York of "a neo-socialist approach to government" and said Reagan's plan "will force people to take a second look." He also brags that

continued on page 42

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

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CORRESPONDENCE

CURIOUS GEORGE

To the editors:
Although I hold no brief for Phyllis George as a journalist, I feel that Judy Bachrach went a bit too far in her hyperbole ("Gorgeous George," June 10). If a male had written the criticism and brought in references to "soiled bra strap" and prostitution, there would be cries of sexism. I think the same standards of taste that would apply to a male critic should apply to Ms. Bachrach.

JOHN F. MCMULLEN
Jefferson Valley, New York

To the editors:
Regarding Judy Bachrach's article on Phyllis George—touché! Ms. Bachrach might have also mentioned all of the other women from within the CBS news organization who were pushed aside in favor of George. All of them showed more skill in journalism during the "trial" months following Diane Sawyer's departure.

The sad thing is that George seems to be a symbol of today's modern woman making it in a man's world. She has made it all right, but for all of the wrong reasons.

GORDON JACOBS
Oakland, California

MORAL PEJORATIVE

To the editors:
Nice footwork, to report approvingly (Notebook, June 10) that "the agony of South Africa's black majority . . . has at last become an issue for Americans" while sneering at the students who have helped make it so. You claim that student pro-divestment demonstrators lack "authenticity" when they demand "that university portfolio managers act morally when the students don't bother to act morally themselves." How do we know they don't act morally? They haven't experienced "the slightest inconvenience or risk themselves," so you say.

More than 1,000 arrested at Cornell, hundreds at Berkeley, more at UCLA, Stanford, Princeton, and elsewhere—no inconvenience? All the students who fear disciplinary action from their "vulnerable institutions"—no risk? So your factual premise is absurd. Ethically, it is fatuous as well. If a political position is validated only by suffering, we are in the realm of masochism, not reason.

Which is not to disagree with you about the desirability of consumer boycotts. You will be pleased to know that the Berkeley student government decided May 1 that its store would stop handling IBM and Hewlett-Packard computers, precisely because of their sales and investments in South Africa.

By the way, prodded by the student movement, more than 1,000 University of California faculty, and a larger number of staff, have signed petitions urging full divestment. Since it is our retirement funds that are at issue, do we pass your test for "genuine motivation"?

TODD GITLIN
Berkeley, California

IN PRAISE OF PRESSURE

To the editors:
In response to your ruminations about "the pressure of the Jews" and the Jewish leaders who met with Mr. Patrick Buchanan and others (TRB, "Pack of Lies," May 27): the discussion was indeed devoted to strenuous efforts to convince the White House that the president should not make the cemetery visit.

So far as pressure is concerned, the pressure of public opinion on our elected officials is one of the healthiest aspects of American democracy, and the advocacy of one's political ideas is the duty of every community leader. It was frankly recognized that the president was of course under pressure in this matter, as he is in every matter that is presented for decision, and we uniformly urged that he should resolve all the conflicting pressures by doing the right and proper thing, which was not to visit the Bitburg cemetery.

KENNETH J. BIALKIN
New York, New York

BARGAIN OF YOUR LIFE

To the editors:
TRB calls the 55-mph speed limit on "lightly traveled interstate highways" "a bad bargain" ("Serfdom and Seat Belts," June 3). His reasoning: if you're killed in a car crash, you lose, on the average, a remaining life span of only 40 years. And it's costing drivers, as a group, 100 years in driving time for each life saved by the 55-mph (as compared to 65) limit. The trouble with TRB's logic is that it compares incomparables: years spent being dead to years spent driving. Suppose you had a choice actually, as you do statistically, between the terms of his equation: (a) you can get in your car tomorrow, drive at 65 mph, and die in a crash; (b) you can get in your car tomorrow, drive at 55 mph for a hundred years, and then live out your remaining normal life of 40 additional years.

A bad bargain? I'd say (b) is irresistible.

JONATHAN PENNER
Tucson, Arizona

TAX REFORM, TAKE THREE

To the editors:
"The alarums about state and local taxes were tremendously exaggerated" (TRB, "Tax Reform, Take Two," June 10). Nonsense. My state and local taxes are one-third of my income. There are thousands so affected.

FRANCES M. EDEIGER
Suffern, New York

ON ED AND EXPLOITATION

To the editors:
In assigning Roger Starr's *The Rise and Fall of New York City* to Jack Newfield ("The Bruised Apple," June 3), you gave Mr. Newfield an opportunity to once again deliver his half-truths on Mayor Koch. For instance, Newfield writes, "When Mayor Koch decided, for reasons of austerity, to close a public hospital . . . he chose Sydenham Hospital in the middle of Harlem." The implication is that racist Koch deliberately selected a Harlem hospital. The reality is that just about all public health experts acknowledged that Sydenham was obsolete and inefficient and the most logical hospital to close, particularly in view of the fact that Harlem, although medically underserved, was not lacking in hospitals.

Newfield also notes that "when the city's health commissioner used the word 'nigger' in a public meeting, Mayor Koch refused to fire him." The specific phrase used by the commissioner was "nigger in the woodpile," a phrase that is an unfortunate remnant of our racist past. But whether someone should be fired for using it is a bit trickier than if he

continued on page 42

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
JULY 8, 1985

HERE WE GO AGAIN

TWA Flight 847 is not the first hijacking to be turned into a hostage-taking. Nine years ago another airliner was diverted from Europe to an airport where the hijackers found support, reinforcements, and protection. At Entebbe there was also a selection, Nazi-like, of passengers, with Jews consigned to special treatment. Nabih Berri, the Shiite leader who has taken over today's hostages, may not be as cruel and capricious as Idi Amin. But Berri is playing the role Amin played at Entebbe nine years ago. As Berri announced at a press conference, "I am not a go-between. I am a party" to the hijacking. So much for the anointed moderate in the situation. Without his support, this would have remained a two-man hijacking. Berri, incidentally, is Lebanon's minister of justice.

The real difference between Entebbe and Beirut is that there will be no rescue. The only real question is how complete the capitulation will be to the terrorists' demands. Israel, which originally announced that it would release Shiite prisoners only in response to an American request, apparently is changing its position. As of this writing, it appears open to requests from the International Red Cross for release of the prisoners. The purpose of the change would be to spare the United States the humiliation of having to ask Israel to capitulate. The IRC maneuver will fool no one. It certainly will not fool future terrorists.

The trajectory from Entebbe to Beirut reflects the progressive demoralization of the West in the face of terrorism. Nowhere is that demoralization more evident than in Israel's release in May of over 1,000 prisoners, including dozens of the worst murderers, in exchange for three captured Israeli soldiers. Thus shamed, as it were, by the example of other (Palestinian) terrorists, the Shiites are unlikely to accept any settlement that does not give them a comparable victory. Now that Israel, author of the Entebbe rescue, has acceded to such grossly disproportionate blackmail, the whole structure of Western resistance to terrorism is endangered.

Still, the terrorists chose an American plane, not an Israeli one. America has become the target of opportunity for terrorist attacks in the Middle East. The reason is simple. The attacks incur no penalty. The Lebanese have seen close up American indecisiveness and weakness. American troops were once deployed in Lebanon, first for dubious reasons, but ultimately to try to shore up a pro-Western government against Shiite and Druse challenges. In the end, our forces, USS *New Jersey* and all, withdrew after lobbing a few shells, losing hundreds of men, and never venturing beyond the perimeter of our base at—the irony is now complete—the Beirut airport, now wholly in Shiite hands.

The U.S. is supposed to have trained a crack antiterrorist unit, called Delta Force, for just such situations. But if it is trained for just such situations, why is it stationed in North Carolina? Clearly it will be called into action in the Middle East, not Thailand or Chile. By the time it was reported to have arrived in Cypress, and some of its men reportedly sent to East Beirut, it was too late. The hijackers had turned the affair into a hostage-taking by removing their prisoners from the plane and disbursing them in West Beirut.

If Israel and the United States have shown a lack of resolve in dealing with terrorists, one party in the current hijacking has shown a malicious callousness. Greece had a lot to do with this hijacking. Its airport is known to have very lax security, and in this affair it was more lax than usual. In this day of X-ray machines and metal detectors and careful screening, two passengers in transit from Beirut were able to smuggle on board two nine-millimeter pistols and two grenades. It could only have been done as a result of extraordinary negligence on the part of the Greeks, or, more likely, with the help of cooperative or corrupt Greek officials.

Having helped cause the tragedy, the Greek government instantly washed its hands of it. One would-be hijacker was captured at Athens airport. Within hours, the Greeks had released him and flown him to Algeria to rejoin the event in progress. This, in exchange for the Greek nationals (and Greek-Americans) on the plane.

If it is difficult for the U.S. to fight terrorism when allies act like enemies, it is even more difficult when some American terrorism "experts" act as advocates for the terrorists, and when American television acts as advocates

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for the hostages' families. One is usually spared the sight on television of Roger Fisher, conflict resolution guru and specialist in explaining in the most civilized terms the "underlying causes" of the worst barbarities. It takes a hijacking to bring him to life, and sure enough, there he was this week on the air, expounding on the United States's lack of attentiveness to Shiite grievances. If only we would open other avenues—political avenues—for them, they would not have to resort to such dastardly means to reach us.

This is perfect rubbish. Hijacking, kidnapping, murder, and massacre are the way Shiites and other factions in Lebanon do their political business. It is not a last resort forced on them by the West (is there any evil in the Third World not forced on it by the West?); it is their first resort. As for the grievance of radical Shiism, it is bottomless, as Fouad Ajami has argued so compellingly on TV these last days. Its nemesis is modernity, and the West as the bringer of modernity, and the United States as the leader of the West. All other complaints—Israel's existence, Shiite prisoners, Arab secularists—follow. One does not satisfy such a grievance. (In fact, this particular piece of barbarism had nothing to do with securing the release of Israel's Shiite prisoners. Everybody knew that 500 of them had already been sent home to Lebanon from Haifa and that the remainder were also scheduled to go.)

Furthermore, in the Lebanese context, the Shiite's complaint is best addressed to other Arabs, principally other Lebanese. It is the Lebanese, not the Israelis or the Americans, who kept the Shiites backward and oppressed for the 40 years since independence. The Shiite grievance against the Palestinians, for example, is so great that even as the TWA plane sat on the runway in Beirut, shells from the "war of the camps" between Amal and the PLO were raining down around it.

Television has also become a potent advocate for settlement, on whatever terms. This happens largely through inadvertence. Television needs to search for a story when it can't reach a story. So it focuses almost obsessively on what is at hand: the victims' anxious, sometimes grieving families. It is inevitable that once one's gaze is fixed on the identifiable individuals who are suffering, the pressure to settle, at any cost, grows.

Some television advocacy, however, is less inadvertent. On Monday, Day 4, an upcoming "Nightline" program was continually plugged during evening broadcasts as "Are positions hardening in the hostage crisis?" (Tune in at. . . .) It was only a promo, but it was very revealing. "Hardening" is hardly a neutral word to describe resisting blackmail.

Is there any alternative to "flexibility," i.e., disguised surrender? In this instance, it is too late. The only remaining alternatives appear to be a more or less endless Iranian-style hostage crisis that is enormously debilitating to American morale and the U.S. ability to conduct a foreign policy elsewhere, or capitulation to the terrorists. And now that individual hostages and their families have entered the national psyche through television, it will be hard to do anything but put their safety above all else.

But as soon as this hostage-taking is over, we can set a firm policy for the future. It should start with a joint resolution of Congress declaring in advance its unconditional support, in any future hostage-taking, for an American policy of refusal to negotiate until the hostages are released. Congress must do this before the next batch of Americans are abducted, before they become identifiable individuals, while they are still the unknown victims of the future—the kind we are already sacrificing every time we cave in to terrorist demands and thus provoke further hijackings. Such a resolution could be passed. And it would give any administration in future cases a strong counterweight to the pressures to pay off terrorism.

Furthermore, the U.S. should show that such incidents will not occur with impunity. The first to be punished should be Greece, for criminal negligence and perhaps collusion with the terrorists, and for its disgusting private peace with them. For this, Greece deserves a total boycott of American aircraft and denial of landing rights to its own carriers in the U.S. And most important, a message should be sent to Nabih Berri, to his Shiite followers, and to his backers in Syria and Iran. That message should be delivered not by diplomatic pouch, but by the aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet, surgically and surely, to appropriate targets, of which there is no shortage.

NOTEBOOK

□ SEQUEL TO THE PREQUEL: Universal Press Syndicate must be perplexed at the tastes of some of its subscribers. A few weeks ago it decided not to distribute Garry Trudeau's series of six "Doonesbury" strips satirizing *The Silent Scream*, on the grounds that too many newspaper editors would find the strips offensive. (The sequence, "Silent Scream II: The Prequel," first appeared in TNR on June 10.) But the syndicate didn't anticipate the same reaction to Trudeau's current week of strips, whose target is Frank Sinatra. Several squeamish papers, including *The Dallas Times Herald*, have decided that these strips are not worthy of publication. How to placate "Doonesbury" addicts during the week-long gap? The *Times Herald* had the solution: it filled the space with the "Silent Scream" series.

□ PROFILE IN COURAGE: Young, friendly, and fluent in English, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India was bound to be received warmly when he visited the United States in June. When he told a joint session of Congress that he wants "a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures sovereignty, integrity, independence, and nonaligned status," his audience erupted in cheers. No one was rude enough to point out that when Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in May, his hosts were accorded the same diplomatic niceties. How much did the Soviets hear from him in public pronouncements on the subject of freeing Afghanistan? Not a peep.

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The new jewel in the GOP crown.

QUEEN JEANE

SCENE ONE. Inside the Beltway. The signal from the elite of Washington's political community is a cool thumbs-down on Democrat-turned-Republican Jeane Kirkpatrick. No future. "She gives college-professor gloom-and-doom speeches," says a Republican official, and an admirer. "It's her temperament. You have to be optimistic to rally the forces. You have to have a theory of victory. You can't sound like Whittaker Chambers, which she does." Another Republican strategist, who says he is a friend of Kirkpatrick, adds: "Her political stock is already beginning to plummet. She's too accessible. She has no sense of rhythm and no clear political goals."

Scene Two. Outside the Beltway. Dozens of men and women cluster around Kirkpatrick in the backyard of a suburban home in Silver Spring, Maryland. They all but cling to the hem of her garment—in this case, a cream-colored, summer-weight knit suit with a golden bird-shaped pin on her lapel. It is a sweaty Sunday afternoon in mid-June, and 300 people show up to welcome Kirkpatrick to the Maryland GOP, and to mingle with her. After she delivers a short speech, she is asked if she expects to become the first woman president. "That strikes me as unlikely," she replies.

Jeane Kirkpatrick insists that she is not running for anything. Despite speculation to the contrary, she never considered challenging Republican senator Charles Mathias of Maryland next year. Nor is she laying the groundwork for a presidential bid; she declined to establish a political action committee because that might be construed as evidence that she's seeking office. And yet she is achieving precisely what political savants deem out of the question—wild success as a national Republican figure. Only three months a Republican, she is the party's hottest political property, the queen of realignment. "She's the new jewel in the crown," says Maureen Reagan, the president's daughter.

"After the president and vice president, we have more requests for Jeane as a speaker than anyone else," says Frank Fahrenkopf, the Republican national chairman. "They are coming in faster than we can handle them." There are so many, in fact, that she's hired a Republican consultant, David Carmen, to sift through them. Hawaii Republicans want her to spend a week with them and give three speeches. The Washington State GOP says it will plan its fall fund-raising dinner to accommodate her schedule. The Miami party favors her presence at an outdoor gathering. There are scores of similar invitations. During her appearance in Silver Spring, she got two more. One came from the county party chairman, who as he introduced her issued an invitation to address the local party's Lincoln Day dinner this fall.

On June 10 she attracted 1,000 people to a Republican women's dinner in Manchester, New Hampshire—nearly twice as many people as voted for Senator Bob Dole in the state's presidential primary in 1980. The crowd booed when she said she wasn't seeking any elective office. Kirkpatrick got the conquering hero's treatment from the passionately right-wing Manchester *Union Leader*, which is normally reserved solely for Ronald Reagan. Her arrival was touted in a front-page editorial by publisher Nacky Loeb. "Jeane Kirkpatrick wields more top-level influence in politics than any other American woman today and she didn't achieve that by sniveling about women's rights," wrote Mrs. Loeb. The next day Kirkpatrick's comments in a speech and press conference were trumpeted in a front-page story. "Kirkpatrick: Soviets on Notice," said the banner headline, and the story quoted her as saying that Reagan had boldly warned the Soviets he'd adhere to the SALT II treaty only so long as they do. The next day she was the subject of the paper's lead editorial. It called her a "magnificent lady," and said she had "appealed to people of intelligence and clear perception."

Well, she appealed to Republicans at any rate, which is more than can be said about her first outing last April. That was a speech in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. She bombed. Since then she has developed a special speech for Republican rallies. It is less lugubrious and apocalyptic than her more serious addresses, and not so didactic. And it leaves out references to her favorite authors, though an article in *The Times* of London is cited. Instead, she touts party realignment, flays the Democrats, and declares that "freedom works" wherever it is tried.

"It's clear now," she begins. "The long expected realignment of political parties has taken place. The Reagan coalition has displaced the Roosevelt coalition as this country's center of political gravity." Why? Democrats are still offering solutions appropriate to the Depression, not the 1980s. "For Democrats, collectivist solutions undertaken in time of dire emergency became the social policy of choice—from equal opportunity to racial and sexual quotas, from integration to forced busing, from civil liberties to defense of lawlessness, from regulation to stagnation," she says. "The Democratic Party has traveled far down these slipping slopes, traumatized by yesterday's failures, captives to yesterday's success." But the nation has "moved on" to a "new industrial revolution [that] took a great leap forward in the wake of Ronald Reagan's election," his new economic policies having "provided new incentives to work, save, invest, and risk." And the rest of the world is learning the same lesson, namely that systems "based on personal freedom and individual motivation" work best.

NOTICE the embrace of Reaganomics. One reason Republican professionals figured Kirkpatrick would falter in national politics was that her domestic views were seen as too liberal. If they were, they aren't now. As recently as last August at the Republican National Convention, Kirkpatrick identified herself as a "welfare state liberal." Now she says she is "just as comfortable calling

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myself a welfare state conservative." That shoe fits. "I believe there are programs—including day care, Head Start, curriculum enrichment for ghetto kids, child health, old-age protection—that are important. I think some of the regulations that protect us against unscrupulous manipulation of the stock market or banks are important. So are health regulations. But they can be pushed too far."

Where Kirkpatrick faces potential trouble with conservatives is on abortion. Her position is fuzzy. She was once listed in *Ms.* magazine as pro-choice. "I have never described myself that way," she says. "The reason I don't is that language has come to be associated with a current range of practices which are pretty barbaric." Still, she doesn't proclaim herself pro-life. "I think abortion is always a genuine tragedy and that it is, above all, tragic for the woman involved, the mother, and never to be taken lightly." Nor does she like *Roe v. Wade*, the 1973 ruling that made abortion legal. Emotional matters like abortion, she argues, are best decided at the community level. "I'm sort of Aristotelian and Burkean," she adds. Got that?

JEANE KIRKPATRICK BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

What keeps Kirkpatrick from becoming a politico of the ordinary run are the grave speeches she gives on geopolitics. In May, in a speech to the Cuban American National Federation, she pointed out the parallels between Cuba and Nicaragua, noting the Cubans have reneged on their promise not to export subversion. "Anyone who argues that the U.S. should enter an agreement to guarantee the Nicaraguan government must . . . explain why Nicaragua will be more likely to keep an agreement than the government of Cuba," she declared. At the National Press Club she gave a well-reasoned defense of American intervention in Grenada, and attacked Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. To say they are similar, she contended, "is to deny the relevance of context and consequences to moral and legal judgment: it is like asking us to look only at the knife that cuts into an abdomen without taking account of whether the man wielding it is a surgeon or Jack-the-Ripper, or whether the patient is likely to be cured by the knife or destroyed."

Will the Kirkpatrick fad last? The answer is probably yes, though she is taking the summer off in the south of France to work on her book about her United Nations experiences. (Her contract with Simon and Schuster is for $900,000.) It will be published in early 1987, assuring a round of heavy attention just as the 1988 presidential race is coming into focus. "The timing is not calculated," she says. In the meantime, there will be speeches to give. Her normal fee is $20,000, and she plans to give 50 or so addresses at this price over the next year. But she also will deliver dozens of free speeches to Republican groups and others. And there is a weekly newspaper column that *The Los Angeles Times* will syndicate starting in September. Kirkpatrick denies she'll get $150,000 a year for it, as *Time* reported, but she won't disclose the real price.

Though hardly a militant feminist, Kirkpatrick says the fascination in the press and political community with her income is sexist. "Nobody ever talks that way about men," she says. "Nobody ever writes about Henry Kissinger that way. Nobody says, what about how much he makes? Nobody writes, how much did Kissinger get for his book? Or, how much does he make for a speech? What'd he make his first year [out of office]? How much did he make off his column? A lot more than I ever made. Nobody ever writes that. It's a sex thing."

Part of her political appeal is a sex thing—she's a woman. The blend of this fact, her stern countenance, and her hard-line foreign policy and defense position give her an unusual appeal. "She comes very close to being charismatic," says Howard Pennimen, a fellow political scientist at the American Enterprise Institute. Most important, she would add balance to any conceivable Republican ticket in 1988, if only because she's a woman. "If you're George Bush, you need someone to balance you on the macho side," suggests Norman Ornstein, another AEI

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colleague. "If you're Jack Kemp, it works, too. He needs an intellectual on his ticket, and she provides a foreign policy side."

The biggest surprise about Kirkpatrick, though, is that she has a sense of humor. "Becoming ambassador to the United Nations was quite an ordeal," she told a Washington group. "I remember people chanting and waving death masks. And that was just the White House staff." When she told someone she had "half a mind to get into politics, they said that's more than you'll ever need." Those jokes may not be the envy of Eddie Murphy, but recall for a moment what happened to the last politician with a newspaper column, a conservative speech, and a bag of quips.

FRED BARNES

Are the Soviets cheating?

SALT SHAKERS

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S declaration of June 10 that the United States will continue to abide by SALT II at least until the end of the year deepens rather than resolves the controversy over Soviet cheating on arms control agreements. Reagan's announcement, like many previous statements from the administration, accused the Soviet Union of violating nuclear arms agreements. And it makes future U.S. compliance contingent on the correction of the alleged violations. Reagan said he intends to reconsider the issue in December after the Pentagon submits a report on U.S. options in response to continuing Soviet violations. Given Reagan's view that at least one of the Soviet violations is "irreversible," it seems likely that he will find the Soviets guilty as charged. And if Reagan remains true to his word, that will spell the end of full U.S. adherence to SALT II, and may even lead to complete renunciation of the treaty.

Three allegations of Soviet cheating lie at the heart of the present controversy. In each case the Soviet Union is probing gray areas in the SALT agreements in ways the United States finds unacceptable. In each case some ambiguity remains about whether the Soviets' actions constitute treaty violations, and in each case there is a grain of plausibility to the Soviets' justification for their behavior.

The most serious compliance issue involves a large radar station under construction near Krasnoyarsk, a city in central Siberia. According to public reports about classified intelligence data, this installation appears to be capable of detecting attacking American missiles fired from Trident submarines. If so, it is a clear violation of Article VI (b) of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which permits early warning radars to be built only on the periphery of the country and facing outward. Since Krasnoyarsk is hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet Union's borders, there is no way that this radar can be construed as being "on the periphery."

The complication is that large radar stations can serve other important functions besides early warning. They are essential for what is known as battle management, that is, targeting incoming warheads for antiballistic missile forces; they can track satellites in space; and they monitor missile tests. The ABM Treaty sought to limit the battle management capabilities of early warning radars by limiting their location to the periphery, while permitting the space-tracking and intelligence activities. In fact, an appendix to the ABM Treaty of 1972 known as Agreed Statement F specifically exempts radars for those purposes from the provisions of the agreement. In effect, there is a defect in the treaty. Agreed Statement F contradicts Article VI by providing legal grounds for deploying large phased-array radars in the interior of the country.

The Soviets have exploited this loophole. They insist that the Krasnoyarsk facility will track satellites, and argue further that its dedication to this purpose will become clearer as time goes by. However, even arms control advocates critical of the Reagan administration find the Soviet story to be dubious, since the published reports on Krasnoyarsk indicate that the new facility closely resembles existing Soviet early warning radar stations. If the United States were to accept the Soviet position, the Soviets could establish a network of similar radar stations throughout the country. This would undercut the 1972 ABM Treaty, which aimed at blocking the construction of ABM systems by either superpower. Even if the Soviets have found a legal loophole that permits the Krasnoyarsk installation, their interpretation is and should be unacceptable to the U.S.

The Krasnoyarsk radar station, though, is not an insurmountable issue. It alone can provide only a small portion of the coverage needed to make a Soviet ABM system effective. For example, U.S. ICBMs headed for the Soviet Union would go over the the North Pole, an area that the Krasnoyarsk station cannot cover. U.S. security is not appreciably affected by the station.

IN A DIFFERENT political climate, the Standing Consultative Commission could be employed to close the loophole. The commission was set up as part of SALT I to clarify the line between permitted and prohibited activities. If serious discussions about Krasnoyarsk were taking place, the commission could conceivably amend the treaty to allow both sides to deploy one and only one large phased-array radar in the interior of the country. This would allow the United States to match Krasnoyarsk if it so desired, while eliminating the open-ended loophole offered by Agreed Statement F. Such an outcome would certainly be preferable to the present situation.

But the superpowers are not seriously addressing the Krasnoyarsk issue. Reagan counts Krasnoyarsk as a clear-cut violation and considers it to be an indication of Soviet interest in breaking out of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets

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CLASSICS ON CASSETTES

BACH

331488-391482. Bach: Brandenberg Concertos, 1 to 6 (complete)—Kapp, Philharmonia Virtuosi of New York (Counts as 2—*Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

330530. Bach: Greatest Hits, Vol. 1—*Jesu, Joy Of Man's Desiring;* many more (CBS Masterworks)

330571. Bach: Greatest Hits, Vol. 2—*Sheep May Safely Graze; Brandenburg Concerto No. 2;* etc. (CBS Masterworks)

326983. Bach: Organ Masterpieces—*Toccata & Fugue in D Minor,* etc. A. Newman (Sine Qua Non)

171504. Switched-On-Bach—Moog versions of *Air on a G String;* more. Wendy Carlos (Columbia)

319434. Bach: Sonatas for Viola De Gamba & Harpsichord—Yo-Yo Ma, cello; Ken Cooper, harpsichord *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

316216. Bach's Suite No. 2 for Flute; Telemann: Flute Suite in A Minor—J. Baker, A. Newman, others *(Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

331470-391474. Bach: Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 1—Anthony Newman, harpsichord (Counts as 2—*Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

BEETHOVEN

273409. Beethoven: 3 Piano Sonatas—Moonlight, Appassionata, Pathetique. Horowitz, piano (Columbia)

325340. Beethoven: "Hammerklavier" Sonata; 11 Bagatelles—Rudolf Serkin (Masterworks Portrait)

332049. Beethoven: Piano Trios No. 4 & 5—Barenboim, Zukerman, DuPre (Vox Cum Laude)

330084. Beethoven: Overtures—Coriolan, Egmont, Fidelio, Lenore. Sir Georg Solti, Chicago Sym. (London Jubilee)

334342. Beethoven: Septet in E-Flat Major—performed by Boston Symph. Chamber Players (Nonesuch Silver Series)

332122. Beethoven: String Quartet in A Minor (Op. 132)—Fitzwilliam Quartet *(Digital*—London)

232496. Beethoven: Symphony No. 3 (Eroica)—Bernstein and New York Philharmonic (Columbia)

331108. Beethoven: Symphony No. 7—Tilson Thomas, English Chamber Orch. (CBS Masterworks)

252874. Beethoven: Symphony No. 9 (Choral)—Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orch. (Columbia)

325654-395657. Beethoven: Piano Concertos No. 1 & 5 (Emperor)—Brendel, piano (Counts as 2—Vox)

230425. Beethoven: Violin Concerto—Isaac Stern; Bernstein, New York Phil. (Columbia)

331991. Beethoven: Violin Sonatas No. 7 & 10—Zukerman, Barenboim (Vox Cum Laude)

BRAHMS

307884. Brahms: Double Concerto—Zukerman, violin; Harrell, cello; Mehta, N.Y. Phil. (Columbia)

334334. Brahms: Horn Trio (Op. 40); **Trio For Clarinet, Cello, Piano**—Boston Symphony Chamber Players *(Digital*—Nonesuch)

333757. Brahms: Serenade No. 1 in D—G. Schwarz, Los Angeles Chamber Orch. *(Digital*—Nonesuch)

330118. Brahms: String Quintets in F and G Major—Boston Sym. Chamber Players *(Digital*—Nonesuch)

328039. Brahms: Symphony No. 3; Haydn Variations—Mehta, New York Phil. (CBS Masterworks)

326280. Brahms: Violin Concerto—Isaac Stern; Ormandy, Philadelphia Orch. (CBS Great Performances)

329110. Brahms/Schoenberg: Piano Quartet—a masterful transcription! Comissiona, Baltimore Sym. *(Digital—Vox Cum Laude)*

DEBUSSY

330605. Debussy: Greatest Hits—*Clair de lune, Reverie,* etc. Bernstein, Ormandy, etc. (Columbia)

322826. Debussy: La Mer; Nocturnes—Michael Tilson Thomas, Philharmonia Orch. *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

328005. Debussy: Images (complete); **Estampes;** etc.—Ivan Moravec, pianist *(Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

296830. Debussy: Quartet; Ravel: Quartet—Tokyo String Quartet (Columbia)

328401. Debussy: Sonata for Flute, Viola and Harp; Syrinx for Solo Flute—plus works by Ravel, Faure, etc. Orpheus Trio *(Digital*—Vanguard Audiophile)

HAYDN

326561. Haydn: 3 Favorite Concertos—Cello in D (Yo-Yo Ma); Violin in C (Cho-Liang Lin); Trumpet in E-Flat (Wynton Marsalis). (CBS Masterworks)

257956. Haydn: Symphony No. 101 (Clock), **No. 103** (Drum Roll)—Bernstein, N.Y. Phil. (Columbia)

332569. Haydn: Symphony No. 94 (Surprise), **No. 100** (Military)—Solti, London Phil. *(Digital*—London)

MOZART

332551. Mozart: Exultate, jubilate; Regina coeli; etc.—Emma Kirby, soprano; Christopher Hogwood, con. *(Digital*—L'Oiseau-lyre)

330688. Mozart: Piano Concertos No. 6 & 13—Murray Perahia, piano; English Chamber Orch. *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

294264. Mozart: Piano Concerto No. 21 (Elvira Madigan) and **No. 17**—Ashkenazy plays, conducts Philharmonia Or. (London)

326975. Mozart: Violin Concerto No. 4; Adagio; Rondos—Zukerman plays, conducts St. Paul Chamber Orch. (CBS Masterworks)

318311. Mozart: Symphonies 36 (Linz) **38** (Prague)—Rampal, Mostly Mozart Orch. (CBS Masterworks)

325365. Mozart: Eine Kleine Nachtmusik; Symphony No. 40—Casals. Marlboro Festival Orch. (Masterworks Portrait)

313007-393009. Mozart: Violin Concertos 3, 4, 5; Sinfonia Concertante—Isaac Stern, etc. (Counts as 2—CBS Masterworks)

SCHUBERT

322487. Schubert: "Death and the Maiden"; "Quartettsatz"—Tokyo String Quartet *(Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

325092. Schubert: Sonata in B Flat; etc.—Alicia de Larrocha *(Digital*—London)

321729. Schubert: The Impromptus, Op. 90 & 142—Murray Perahia, piano *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

317677. Schubert: Symphony No. 8 (Unfinished); **Rosamunde Overture and Ballet Music**—von Karajan, Berlin Philharmonic (Angel)

TCHAIKOVSKY

312777. Tchaikovsky: Capriccio Italien; Rimsky-Korsakoff: Capriccio Espagnol; etc.—Bernstein (CBS Great Performances)

308874. Tchaikovsky: Piano Concerto No. 1—Gavrilov; Kitaenko cond. Moscow Radio/TV Sym. Orch. (Col/Melodiya)

329169. Tchaikovsky: Symphony No. 4—Lorin Maazel, Cleveland Orch. (CBS Masterworks)

245399. Tchaikovsky: Symphony No. 6 (Pathetique)— Ormandy and Phila. Orch. (Columbia)

326249. Tchaikovsky: 1812 Overture; Marche Slav; Romeo & Juliet—Bernstein, New York Philharmonic (CBS Great Performances)

293191. Tchaikovsky: Violin Concerto; Meditation—Stern; Rostropovich, National Sym. (Columbia)

231563. Tchaikovsky: Swan Lake and **Sleeping Beauty Ballet Suites**—Ormandy, Philadelphia Orchestra (Columbia)

304352-394353. Tchaikovsky: The Nutcracker (complete)—Andrew Davis, Toronto Symphony Orch. (Counts as 2—Columbia)

330555. Tchaikovsky: Greatest Hits—*Waltz Of The Flowers; 1812 Overture;* more. Bernstein, N.Y. Phil.; Ormandy, Phila. (Columbia)

BAROQUE

323543. Handel: Royal Fireworks Music; Oboe Concertos 1-3—Karl Munchinger, Stuttgart Chamber Orch. *(Digital*—London)

329615. Handel: Water Music. Malgorie, La Grande Ecurie & la Chambre duRoy *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

326595. Music For The Kings of France—harpsichord suites by Marchand and Couperin. Igor Kipnis (Nonesuch Silver Series)

316406. Pachelbel Canon & Other Baroque Favorites—also Bach's *Jesu, Joy Of Man's Desiring;* etc. Boyd Neel, Toronto Chamber Orch. *(Digital*—MMG)

331462. Purcell: Music For The Theater—*King Arthur; Fairy Queen;* more suites. McIntosh, City of London Chamber Orch. *(Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

324525. An Isaac Stern Vivaldi Gala: Concertos For 2 and 3 Violins; etc. Stern, Zukerman, Perlman, etc. (CBS Masterworks)

319004. Glass, Philip: The Photographer—A modern classic (CBS)

201665. Grofe: Grand Canyon Suite—Ormandy, Phila. Orch. (Columbia)

326272. Holst: The Planets—Bernstein, New York Phil. (CBS Great Performances)

330126. Kodaly: Hary Janos Suite; Alfven: Swedish Rhapsody—Comissiona, Baltimore Symphony *(Digital—Vox Cum Laude)*

318246. Orff: Carmina Burana—Muti, Philharmonia Orch. & Chorus (Angel)

332130. Bruckner: Symphony No. 4—Walter, Columbia Symphony Orch (Masterworks Portrait)

333518. Bruckner: Symphony No. 7—Chailly, RSO Berlin *(Digital*—London)

333856. Chopin: Greatest Hits—*Grande Valse Brillante, Military Polonaise, Minute Waltz,* etc. Various artists (CBS Masterworks)

306183. Chopin: Piano Concerto No. 1—Murray Perahia; Zubin Mehta and New York Philharmonic (Columbia)

MODERN

329714. Bartok: Concerto for Orchestra; Dance Suite—Solti conducts Chicago Sym. *(Digital*—London)

325316. Bartok: Violin Concerto No. 2; Rhapsodies 1-2—Isaac Stern; Bernstein, New York Phil. (Masterworks Portrait)

325274. Berg: Lulu Suite—also works by Webern and Schoenberg. Philadelphia Orch., Ormandy (Masterworks Portrait)

263293. Bolling: Suite For Flute and Jazz Piano—Rampal and Bolling (Columbia)

324780. Bolling: Suite for Cello and Jazz Piano—Yo-Yo Ma, Bolling (CBS)

309500. Copland: "Billy The Kid" (Ballet Suite); **Four Dance Episodes from "Rodeo"**—Bernstein cond. (CBS Great Performances)

326439. Copland: Rodeo; Dance Symphony; El Salon Mexico; Fanfare for Common Man—Dorati, Detroit Sym. *(Digital*—London)

240473. Copland: Appalachian Spring (complete)—Copland and London Symphony (Columbia)

329060. Falla: Nights in The Gardens Of Spain; Three-Cornered Hat (Suite No. 2); etc.—Osorio, piano; de la Fuente, Xalapa Sym. *(Digital*—Vox Cum Laude)

326256. Ives: Symphony No. 3; Decoration Day; etc.—Bernstein, N.Y. Phil. (Masterworks Portrait)

318691. Prokofiev: Love For Three Oranges Suite; Lt. Kije Suite—Thomas, L.A. Phil. (CBS Masterworks)

318451. Ravel: Bolero; Pavane; Daphnis Et Chloe (Suite No. 2)—Andre Previn, London Symphony (Angel)

331447. Ravel: Ma Mere L'Oye (Mother Goose); **Le Tombeau De Couperin;** etc.—Dutoit, Montreal Sym. *(Digital*—London)

324533. Respighi: Feste Romane; Pines & Fountains Of Rome—Dutoit, Orch. de Montreal *(Digital*—London)

326223. Schoenberg: Pelleas & Melisande—Daniel Barenboim and Orchestre de Paris (CBS Masterworks)

324046. Shostakovich: Cello Concerto No. 1; Kabalevsky: Cello Conc. No. 1—Yo-Yo Ma, cello; Ormandy, Phila. Orch. *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

333450. Shostakovich: Symphony No. 8—Haitink, Amsterdam Concertgebouw *(Digital*—London)

326405. Stravinsky: The Firebird (complete ballet)—Dohnanyi; Vienna Phil. *(Digital*—London)

281493. Stravinsky: Rite Of Spring—Zubin Mehta, N.Y. Phil. (Columbia)

ROMANTICS

325282. Bruch: Violin Concerto; Lalo: Symphonie Espagnole—Francescatti; Mitropoulos, Schippers, New York Philharmonic (Masterworks Portrait)

326454. Dvorak: Cello Concerto; Bruch: Kol Nidrei—Harrell, cello; Ashkenazy cond. *(Digital*—London)

333526-393520. Dvorak: Slavonic Dances (Op. 46, 72); **American Suite**—Dorati, Royal Phil. (Counts as 2—*Digital*—London)

325183. Dvorak: Symphony No. 9 (New World)—Solti, Chicago Symph. Orch. *(Digital*—London)

331090. Franck: Great Organ Works—3 Chorals, others. Peter Hurford, organ *(Digital*—Argo)

228684. Grieg: Peer Gynt Suites 1 and 2; Bizet: Carmen Suites—Leonard Bernstein and the New York Phil. (Columbia)

325381. Grieg: Piano Concerto; Schumann: Piano Concerto—Leon Fleisher, Szell, Cleveland Orch. (Masterworks Portrait)

321208. Liszt: Hungarian Rhapsodies 2,3,5; Mephisto Waltz—Willi Boskovsky, London Phil. (Angel)

314369. Mahler: Symphony No. 1 (Titan)—Maazel, Orch. Nat'l de France (CBS Masterworks)

317685. Mahler: Symphony No. 4—Ameling; Previn, Pittsburgh Sym. (Angel)

325357. Mahler: Das Lied von der Erde—soloists, New York Philharmonic under Bruno Walter (Masterworks Portrait)

305730. Mendelssohn: Symphony No. 4 (Italian); **Overtures**—Andre Previn, London Symphony (Angel)

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:056. Mendelssohn: fidsummer Night's :am; etc. Zinman, :hester Philharmonic ;ital—Vox Cum Laude)

698. Offenbach: Gaite Isienne; Saint-Saens: nse Macabre; etc.—azel. Orch. National France (Columbia)

)589. Rachmaninoff: eatest Hits—*Vocalise,* : (CBS Masterworks)

5043. Rachmaninoff: ino Concertos No. 1 & 2 \shkenazy; Previn, ndon Sym. (London)

314260. Salieri: Sinfonia Veneziana; more—Pesko and London Symphony (CBS Masterworks)

234237. Schumann: Piano Concerto; Mendelssohn: Piano Concerto No. 1—Rudolf Serkin; Ormandy, Phila. Orch. (Columbia)

225888. Smetana: Moldau, Bartered Bride Overture, Dances; etc. Bernstein, N.Y. Phil. (Columbia)

310870-390872. Johann Strauss' Greatest Waltzes Ormandy, Szell, Bernstein (Count as 2—Columbia)

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310086. Wagner: Overtures *Flying Dutchman, Rienzi,* etc. Maazel, Philharmonia Orch. (Columbia)

330654. Weber: Music For Wind Ensemble—*6 Waltzes; Concertino for Oboe & Winds;* etc. Jean-Claude Malgoire conducts this "Music For A Sunday Afternoon" (CBS Masterworks)

18436. Rimsky-Korsakov: cheherazade—Yevgeny vetlanov and the London ymphony Orch. (Angel)

25100. Saint-Saens: :arnival of the Animals -also works by Debussy, atie. Philip Jones Brass nsemble *(Digital*—London)

31082. Saint-Saens: ymphony No. 3 (Organ)—urford; Dutoit, Montreal ymphony *(Digital*—London)

320424. Richard Strauss: Ein Heldenleben—Dicterow, violin; Mehta and N.Y. Phil. *(Digital*—CBS Masterworks)

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view the administration's allegations as a transparent attempt to justify the abandonment of the ABM Treaty in order to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative. They refuse, even within the official channels of the SCC, to address the legitimate U.S. concerns. There is no sign that this standoff—already two years old—will be resolved before the Reagan reevaluation in December.

THE SECOND compliance issue centers on a new missile known as the SS-X-25. The SALT II agreement included a provision that allows both sides to test and deploy only one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile. Late in 1982 Moscow announced it was testing its new type of ICBM; the U.S. monitored these tests, and labeled the new missile (which carried several warheads) the SS-X-24. But some months later, American intelligence detected flight tests of another missile carrying only one warhead. This missile was designated the SS-X-25. Obviously, to test two new types of ICBM when only one is permitted would be a clear violation of the SALT II agreement. SALT II, however, does allow modernization of existing types of ICBMs, provided there is no change in the number of stages and the fuel type and that the length, diameter, launchweight, and throwweight of the missile are not modified by more than five percent. The Soviets claim that the SS-X-25 is merely the modernized (and therefore permissible) version of an existing missile, the SS-13, that they have deployed for years.

The Reagan administration insists that SS-X-25 differs from its predecessor by more than five percent (by exactly how much, no one has said publicly). The problem is that the SS-13 is an older missile, developed in the 1960s and deployed only in limited number. The Arms Control Association, a private pro-SALT educational group, reported last year that the U.S. has less solid intelligence about the SS-13 than it does about more recent and more important Soviet missiles. Moscow argues that U.S. intelligence underestimated the capabilities of the SS-13, which now means they exaggerate the difference between it and the SS-X-25.

Unlike the Krasnoyarsk controversy, which is the result of a treaty loophole, the SS-X-25 issue is the result of a dispute about facts. The treaty is clear; the evidence is not. Similar situations have arisen in the past—and been resolved to the satisfaction of the United States. In the mid-1970s, for example, it appeared that the Soviets were constructing new missile silos in violation of the SALT I agreement. To allay U.S. concerns, the Soviet Union gave the United States information demonstrating that the facilities under construction did not contain missiles. Moscow has been unwilling, however, to discuss SALT II-related compliance issues because the United States has refused to ratify the treaty. Meanwhile, President Reagan, in his June 10 statement, declared the SS-X-25 to be an irrevocable violation that "cannot be corrected by the Soviet Union," and reserved the right to an equivalent U.S. violation of SALT II—to build a new type of ICBM of our own.

The third area of compliance controversy is at once the clearest, because the change in Soviet behavior is unambiguous, and the murkiest, because the standards of compliance are ill-defined. It involves the rules for electronic eavesdropping. Both the U.S. and the USSR gather intelligence about the other's missile systems by intercepting the communications (known as telemetry) emitted from missiles during test flights. For example, the United States usually learns about the capabilities of missiles like the SS-X-25 from intercepted telemetry. This data is invaluable, if not indispensable, for verifying that the other side is abiding by the technical provisions of the SALT agreements.

The problem is that these communications can be transmitted in code (a practice known as encryption), thus denying data to the other side. SALT II is maddeningly vague about the practice of encryption. It specifically allows both sides to code their data—unless the coding blocks the other side from verifying the treaty. But the treaty leaves it up to the superpowers to decide for themselves if their verification efforts are being hindered. This unhelpful formula emerged because both superpowers preferred to protect the right to encrypt. And to negotiate more specific limitations would have required disclosing U.S. intelligence capabilities, which the United States understandably wished to avoid.

There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has significantly increased the level of encryption in its missile tests since 1981. The Reagan administration protests that the high level of encryption has interfered with its ability to verify Soviet compliance with SALT accords, and hence constitutes a violation. The Soviet Union claims that its encryption record is consistent with the treaty, and it presses for more specific charges. The haziness of SALT II was probably destined to cause a collision of this sort.

Unlike the SS-X-25 tests, which cannot be undone once conducted, encryption is a correctable violation. In future Soviet missile tests, the extent of encryption could be reduced to acceptable levels. But because SALT II was never ratified by the United States, norms of behavior were never developed to reduce the ambiguity left by the treaty provisions. And with the Soviet Union refusing to discuss such matters in the Standing Consultative Commission, it is impossible to establish mutually acceptable guidelines.

THE REAGAN administration says there are many other cases of Soviet cheating. The most comprehensive of the administration's three public reports on Soviet compliance was released in October 1984 by the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. It identified 17 instances of alleged Soviet cheating, another 15 examples of suspicious Soviet activity about which the evidence is insufficient to claim cheating, and numerous breaches of "the duty of good faith" required by international law.

Careful examination, though, reveals that the report contains only a few allegations of actual cheating on arms control agreements. Most of the report details "circumventions" in which the Soviets violated the spirit rather than the letter of the treaty, or "breaches of unilateral

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commitments" in which the Soviets changed their stated military plans without breaching their treaty obligations. These actions, like much of Soviet foreign and military policy, are not to our liking but they do not constitute violations of treaties. And in several of the actual violations the Soviets admitted the infraction, but were unable to meet the treaty deadline and eventually did bring themselves into compliance. Thus many of the administration's allegations are just the sort that earlier presidents would have dismissed as misleading or unfounded.

Indeed, the Krasnoyarsk radar station, the SS-X-25, and the coded telemetry are not inherently insoluble problems. But there is little prospect for the two sides to address the issues in ways that are constructive rather than combative. If Reagan finds Soviet violations uncorrectable now, he is not likely to find them corrected by November. What the Soviets deny now they are likely to still be denying at the end of the year. Reagan's decision may well amount to only a temporary stay of execution for SALT II.

STEVEN E. MILLER

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All totalitarians are not alike.

NAZIS AND SOVIETS

THE INTELLECTUAL topic of the day seems to be equivalences, or the lack thereof, in the behavior of nations. A recent conference in Washington on whether the United States is the "moral equivalent" of the Soviet Union was unable to find anyone to come and argue the affirmative. At the same time, some of those most exercised about that false equivalence insist on another equivalence that I believe is also false: the equivalence of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia under the common rubric of totalitarianism.

Some people have a huge investment in this equivalence, and feel that any challenge to the joint and common uniqueness of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia undermines the basis of a sound American foreign policy. Thus Norman Podhoretz, arguing against President Reagan's visit to the German cemetery at Bitburg, and opposing the view that the fallen soldiers on the wrong side of World War II nevertheless deserve some honor, wrote that making such a gesture "undermines the very foundation on which the president's foreign policy has heretofore stood: that idea that there is something special, something unique, about totalitarian states."

This argument against the Bitburg visit, as Podhoretz writes, is concerned less about the past than about the future; less about what we should think and feel about Nazi Germany than what we should think and feel about Soviet Russia. The point of asserting this particular moral equivalence is not to attribute the crimes of Soviet Russia to Nazi Germany in order to make Nazism seem even more horrible and thus incense us against the president; rather the attempt is to hijack the crimes of Nazi Germany and lay them on Soviet Russia, justifying the strongest measure against it. But the equivalence does not hold.

The term "totalitarian" does not tell us everything that is important about a country. It doesn't tell us whether the country is expansionist. Nazi Germany certainly was, but it may be argued whether Soviet Russia, after a very substantial expansion after World War II, still is. The term doesn't tell us whether all economic enterprise is in the hands of the state. It doesn't tell us what ideology guides the state (racist in Nazi Germany, Marxist in Soviet Russia).

Is China "totalitarian"? At one time it seemed more totalitarian than the Soviet Union. You could not find a peep of dissidence in China, and there were various theories about how totalitarianism had transformed the human nature of the Chinese, and made them into totally new men and women. Well, totalitarianism changed in China. This raises a question about the very core of the distinction made famous by Jeane Kirkpatrick, between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Authoritarianism, it is held, can change or be changed and become democracy; totalitarianism cannot. Historical experience bears this out. On the other hand, totalitarianism can become less totalitarian, as in the case of China, or Yugoslavia, or Hungary—or, dare one say it, even Soviet Russia. Today Soviet dissidents do not disappear by the millions into the gulag. They may be put under house arrest, stripped of their jobs, or be sent to mental hospitals—unjust, to be sure, but better than what used to happen to them in Stalin's time. As for China, there's no evidence that it is on the road to capitalism and democracy. But China is somewhat different from what it was, a difference that is much appreciated by the Chinese people and that does not become insignificant even if we can properly place the label "totalitarianism" over the China of Mao and the China of Deng.

THE EXAMPLE of China raises another problem. The unarguable fact that a certain country is "totalitarian" does not begin to tell us what a proper American foreign policy toward it ought to be. China is totalitarian. So what? We sell it things, and want to sell it more. We'd be happy to provide it with arms, including very advanced arms, etc. It seems that totalitarianism as such need have nothing to do with our foreign policy. We get along well—or try to—with a number of other totalitarian countries, such as Yugoslavia and Hungary. In truth, the foundation of President Reagan's foreign policy is not that "there is something special, something unique" about totalitarianism, but something else, and to my mind a perfectly good basis for foreign policy: to preserve the balance of power against

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the awesome military strength of the Soviet Union.

A refusal to make distinctions between totalitarian regimes makes it impossible to understand the world today, as well as making a muddle of history. Vietnam is totalitarian and allied with Russia; Pol Pot is totalitarian (the worst of them all, probably, short of Hitler), and allied with China. Can anyone deny that a better totalitarianism has replaced a worse in Cambodia? We refuse to recognize the better, not because we prefer the worse, but because we hope there is a "third force" that will be preferable to both.

Hannah Arendt, author of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, believed that to say "totalitarian" told us a good deal about a political regime. When Hitler ruled Germany and Stalin ruled Russia, there was much that supported that belief. But even then there were enormous differences, more important for some people than for others. In Poland Jews and communists and socialists knew that it would be much better to escape to the East (Russia) than to the West (Germany). It was awful in the East, too, and those who could got out fast after the war. But the difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia for many people was as simple as the difference between death and life.

IN OBJECTING to the assertion of "moral equivalence" of all totalitarian regimes, I am concerned about both the past and the future. First, we should not obscure the unique evil of Nazi Germany. That evil had no necessary connection with totalitarianism. "Totalitarian" Fascist Italy (at least it tried to be totalitarian, even if it did not succeed so well) had nothing against its Jews until Hitler forced it to adopt anti-Jewish laws. We will never fully understand the Nazi evil or take its measure. But we can never say Nazi Germany was a nation like other nations—even totalitarian nations.

Second, we should not pretend that this concept of "totalitarianism" can be a real guide to our foreign policy. It doesn't tell us what to do about Russia, or about China. Obviously we cannot be indifferent to totalitarianism. The United States prefers democracy, it defends democracy. If it doesn't, it should. But how that affects its foreign and military policy, in the light of all other considerations that must be weighed, is another matter.

One consequence of the emphasis on totalitarianism is that it lets authoritarianism off the hook. In human terms, what Argentina did to people was far worse than what Yugoslavia, for example, does. There is indeed no comparison. In fact, using torture as a test, it may well be that in any given year the authoritarians come out worse than the totalitarians. But I don't recommend torture as a single test, either. The exigencies of foreign policy have caused us to be friends with torturers. Torture should weigh heavily in the balance. But I don't know if one can set up an absolute rule.

In analyzing our conflict with Soviet Russia, old labels are less and less helpful. Marxism doesn't help, Leninism doesn't help, and even totalitarianism, I would argue, doesn't help much. It does not outline the distinctive characteristics of our conflict that cause it to continue today, long past the time when Marxist (or totalitarian) ideologies served as an internal threat to our friends and allies in Europe. Something else is going on, and the totalitarian label doesn't tell us what it is.

NATHAN GLAZER

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How to break the arms control impasse.

A STAR WARS SOLUTION

THE USUAL *danse macabre* of American-Soviet arms control negotiations is about to begin. The process is typically initiated by a Soviet announcement to leaders of the U.S. government, and to the myriad self-appointed American accommodationists trooping to Moscow to seek on their own a "fair" solution, that the ongoing stalemate is due entirely to American rigidity. The Soviets insist that they cannot give an inch, and that only a massive display of American good faith—translated into unilateral concessions—can revive the negotiations.

In the late 1970s the Soviets made it clear that progress in negotiations would be contingent upon U.S. abandonment of its cruise missile program. In 1984 they premised even the beginning of arms control talks on the dismantling of the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles already deployed in Europe. Then the MX missile came to be designated as the impediment to any compromise. And now the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's so-called Star Wars proposal, has been identified as the mortal enemy of arms control.

These arguments are then faithfully reproduced on the Op-Ed pages of U.S. and West European papers. Renowned professors, former ambassadors, various politicized scientists, and leaders of the arms control lobby plead for a demonstration of American good faith—which happens to coincide with the acceptance of what the Soviets have been demanding. The process of negotiation thus begins in earnest—but among us Americans! The Russians, meanwhile, sit at the table in Geneva and wait for the eventual U.S. concessions.

It is a normal procedure for the United States to prepare for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union by defining a tough opening gambit, to be followed by a more flexible position that would be exercised in conjunction with some demonstrated Soviet willingness to compromise. But it is usually only a matter of time before some disgruntled official leaks the substance of the fallback position to one

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of the ex-ambassadors, peace-loving professors, or any one of the 535 representatives and senators who have lately become our surrogate secretaries of defense and state. Any one of them then feels free to publicize the fallback position as his constructive suggestion. Indeed, the latest fashion is to compose a joint letter published under three or four prestigious signatures, strongly urging the U.S. to make further unilateral concessions in order to convince the Soviets that we are negotiating in earnest. After we prove our good intentions, the Russians may be prepared to accept our third—or fourth—fallback position as a proper match for their own unyielding position.

THE SOVIET argument against SDI and the domestic critics' case against SDI are politically complementary. The Soviets say that SDI threatens the militarization of space, and that there will be no arms control agreement unless it is abandoned. The American critics say SDI will not work, that it will cost too much, that the Soviets can very easily overcome it, and that the Soviets are dreadfully fearful of it. The logical inconsistency of these arguments is less important than the political symmetry of their intended effect—namely that the U.S. should unilaterally forgo the SDI program.

In fact, nothing could be more damaging to the prospects for real arms control than the jettisoning of SDI. Indeed, the time has come for the United States to bite the bullet on the SDI question. Only if a strategic defense system is deployable within the next decade or so, and only if our will to deploy it is proven credible, can the United States trade it for a genuine and comprehensive arms control agreement with the Soviets. It is essential that this system be capable of disrupting and rendering militarily useless a Soviet first strike by intercepting missiles early in flight or by knocking them out as they descend toward the United States. Anything less than that virtually guarantees that there will be no comprehensive arms control agreement.

The reason for this proposition, unpalatable though it may be to the arms control lobby, is rooted both in the changing character of nuclear weaponry and in the nature of Soviet strategic deployments. In the 1970s both sides enjoyed large strategic forces whose primary function was to pose the threat of annihilation to the other country. These systems were not susceptible to preemptive destruction. The emerging reality of the 1980s and 1990s is that both sides are deploying far more accurate weapons. These weapons are capable of a preemptive first strike that could eliminate the opponent's strategic forces—and prevent effective retaliation. For the first time it is possible to contemplate the possibility of an attack that destroys an overwhelming majority of the other side's forces while also disrupting its command and communications structures to such an extent that any response would be marginal, spasmodic, and conceivably not totally destructive. In short, as accuracy increases so does the benefit of striking first.

This is not to argue that the Soviets (or the United States) are likely or certain to launch a first strike. It is simply to say that the nuclear relationship is growing ever more precarious. This is the current danger in the American-Soviet military situation. It needs to be addressed and resolved by the arms control process, if possible; or unilaterally, if arms control remains stalemated.

But there is another problem raised by the advent of the highly accurate weaponry. The Soviet Union is now deploying such forces in large numbers; the United States is not. How can we negotiate effectively in this situation? We somehow have to convince the Soviets to limit the further deployment of their new SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, and to limit significantly the deployment of existing SS-18s and SS-19s, all of which have counterforce capability. Without such limitations, by the early 1990s the Soviets—even by conservative estimates—will have enough missiles to place the entire U.S. arsenal in jeopardy. Only our Trident and Poseidon submarines already out at sea *might* escape destruction from a Soviet first strike. And with the confusion and resulting disintegration of communications systems, the submarine forces might not be in a position to retaliate effectively.

In contrast, the United States is not likely to be able to threaten the Soviet Union in a comparable way. No ongoing or likely deployment program will enable us to launch a disarming attack. Even if the U.S. had some form of strategic defense in order to protect its missile forces, we would still have far too few MX missiles, D-5 missiles on Trident submarines, and Midgetmen to even permit contemplation of such a disarming first-strike attack at any point between now and the end of the century.

IN THESE circumstances, the decision to go ahead with the SDI makes eminent sense. But it also means reformulating it politically and strategically. The U.S. should drop or at least de-emphasize President Reagan's idealistic hope for total nuclear defense for all our population. We should also abandon our unwillingness to consider SDI in the bargaining process. If we implement that part of the SDI program which by the mid-1990s would enable us to disrupt a Soviet first strike, we would reinforce deterrence and promote nuclear stability. That means concentrating on terminal defense and boost-phase interception.

Once we establish our determination to act on the SDI, we are in a better position to strike a bargain. We can say to the Soviets that we both face essentially two choices, one mutually beneficial, the other especially costly to them, but both stabilizing. The first choice is to renegotiate the 1972 ABM treaty to permit deployment of strategic missile defense, but without either side improving its ability to carry out a first strike. Then, in return for significant reductions in SS-24s, SS-25s, SS-18s, and SS-19s, the United States would not deploy its strategic defense system. The second option would be pursued if Soviets were unwilling to accept such a bargain. The United States would unilaterally terminate the ABM treaty and proceed with the SDI. This would render the Soviets' new generation of accurate

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missiles useless and wipe out their multibillion ruble investment in them.

Some critics of the SDI argue that the Soviets could respond by vastly increasing their offensive deployments. There are two problems with this line of thinking. First, if the Soviets do respond by building up, they will confirm the ominous suspicion that they are intent on preserving a first-strike capability against the United States; if so, the urgency of negating that threat is all the greater.

Second, if the Soviets expand their offensive forces, the strategic defense could be expanded proportionally. Remember that such a system would not need to be foolproof since it would not be designed to defend populations; it would only need to be capable of significantly disrupting an attack on U.S. strategic forces. In such a competition we would have the advantage. It would be far cheaper for us to add defensive missiles than for them to add highly accurate offensive missiles. (Those who make the most ambitious claims for the SDI should bear in mind that we could not compete so well if we were seeking to build a foolproof defense of our cities. If our defense had to be 100 percent effective, it would cost us far more to expand it than it would cost the Soviets to expand their offensive forces.)

To shape such an effective U.S. defense strategy and a meaningful negotiating posture, President Reagan's SDI needs to be redefined. We must show the Soviets both that we can deploy a strategic defense system soon and that we will negotiate over its deployment if they are willing to make stabilizing reductions in their offensive missile forces. In the event of Soviet unwillingness to accept such an arrangement, we would be in position unilaterally to achieve strategic security for ourselves. And because the SDI would not be accompanied by a massive deployment of disarming first-strike offensive U.S. systems, we would in no way increase our strategic threat to the Soviets. Either way SDI promises a genuinely stabilized nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is time to act.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Zbigniew Brzezinski was assistant to the president for national security from 1977 to 1981.

Betty Ford ministers to the rich and famous.

ADDICTION À L.A. MODE

BY P. J. CORKERY

Los Angeles

IN A CITY that already regards chefs, hairdressers, and lawyers as acceptable playmates, the flowering of yet another exotic social type can't be regarded as particularly noteworthy. But in Los Angeles this season there's a new species of personal companion on the rialto that is not only positively orchidaceous but that demonstrates just how chic addiction has become. The hottest companion here is a "disenabler."

A "disenabler" (also known as a "key voice") is a person who keeps you from doing drugs or from drinking. I saw my first disenabler at a party given by a producer last February in honor of his new mountainside home in Beverly Hills, an eccentric 35-room pile that looks like Mount Vernon descending Benedict Canyon. As the producer's wife was showing me around, I watched my host, a dapper fellow in his 50s, being followed around by a weather-beaten guy about the same age dressed in jeans, jersey, and a baseball jacket that had the initials "S.O.B." sewn on the back.

The producer and his follower eventually came by and the producer said to me, "Great place isn't it? Meet Charlie." I shook hands with Charlie. The two strolled away. "Is Charlie somebody I should know?" I asked the producer's wife, fearing that I might have insulted some studio face card or other local figure of consequence.

"No," trilled the producer's wife, "Charlie is just here to keep Leo from doing any drugs."

"I didn't know Leo had a problem."

"The worst. Leo just got out of Betty Ford's," she explained. "While I was down at the fat farm in La Costa, Leo checked into Betty Ford's."

"I thought that was a drying-out place."

"Yeah, but everyone goes there. Leo went there for his coke problem. They told him after he got out to go down to the Cocaine Anonymous meetings at Cedars-Sinai. Paul, you should see the women at those meetings. And the men! Primo! All great-looking. Well, anyway, Leo's been going. And Leo talked at one meeting about how hard it is to stay off the stuff at parties.

P. J. Corkery, a Hollywood writer, is addicted to California.

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So somebody suggested he get a guy to keep him from being tempted. That's Charlie. Charlie breaks through the patterns and people that, I guess, 'enable' you to slip back into your old habits, and do drugs. Charlie is a 'disenabler.' "

A few weeks later, I was at another party offering to get the hostess a drink from her own bar when a very high-style woman dressed in white linen intervened. "No, thank you," she said, "I'll get us a couple of Cokes." Off she went, and sensing another "disenabler," I asked my fast-lane friend, "Have you been to Betty's?"

"Yep," she said, "I was there for seven weeks. Now I go to A.A. meetings, and Elsie—"

"The woman in white?"

"Yep . . . is my 'key voice.' She comes along with me when there's a big temptation. A lot of people in my crowd don't like her, but they're the same ones who made it possible for me to continue drinking and doing coke. Elsie 'disenables' for me."

Elsie wasn't the only surprise of the evening. When it came time for the band to play, the bar was shut down. In keeping with the new ethos, it turned into a cocktail-less cocktail party.

BETTY FORD, former first lady, recovering alcoholic, and founder of the Betty Ford Center for the treatment of alcoholism and drug abuse, is the one to thank for these sights. And I do mean thank; through her center and her work, she relieves much misery and despair. Leo's personal puritan and the nonalcoholic cocktail party are comic instances in Los Angeles's persistent belief that everything in life, from achievement to personal tragedy, is of no consequence unless it can be purveyed stylishly and publicly. Mrs. Ford is not to blame if there is such a thing as addiction à L.A. mode.

The center started by Mrs. Ford, to which they're all flocking, is a 14-acre institution at the giant Eisenhower Medical Center in Palm Springs. The elaborate hospital was constructed after we nearly lost Ike in 1956 because then-existing Palm Springs hospitals weren't adequate to his heart condition. The hospital has blossomed since then, and has become a favorite stopping place, especially for Republican first families in need of medical attention. The spirit of philanthropy aimed at resolving the distempers of famous Republicans can be expected to soar in the future. Centers dealing with the morbidities of more recent first families are now being proposed. I understand that the president and Mrs. Reagan will be honored with the Dutch and Nancy Reagan Sugar Tolerance Impairment Pavilion to make the world safe for jelly bean eaters. Not far behind are the plans for the Pat and Richard Nixon Dermatology Wing for further studies in thick and thin skins.

Meanwhile, a stay at the Betty Ford Center is all science can do for someone suffering the diseased life-style of the rich and famous. The Betty Ford Center, which was opened in 1982 at a cost of $5.8 million (all raised privately), is described as "a chemical dependency recovery hospital." Inpatient treatment lasts about six weeks and costs about $150 a day. About 1,900 patients have been treated there since opening. A good many have been celebrities. The center won't release the names of patients, but a careful scrutiny of *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Herald*, and *The Washington Post* reveals that Elizabeth Taylor (she was the first), Mary Tyler Moore, the late Peter Lawford, Johnny Cash, Tony Curtis, Liza Minnelli, and Andy Gibb are among the clientele.

According to spokesmen for the center, the treatment program, which also requires members of the patient's family to come in for one week, combines medical care and group therapy. It is designed to help patients stay away from drugs and liquor, to reconstruct their emotional lives, and to involve themselves after hospitalization with chapters of Alcoholics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous, and other self-help groups.

Patients live in clusters of 20 (there's only room for 60 at any one time) at the hospital and spend virtually the whole day in the residential wing. They have private rooms with patios, but share living spaces, and do all the household cleaning themselves. It's a treatment program, not unlike the one at Long Beach Naval Hospital that Mrs. Ford underwent in 1978, except that at the Betty Ford Center, the program was redesigned to be of especial value to women.

"Most facilities dealing with chemical dependency problems are geared to men," a center official said, "and even in coeducational treatment groups, women are more likely to focus on the men and stay locked into their traditional role of nurturing others and putting the needs of others before their own." So a portion of the program and one wing of the center are designed just for women.

"In this program," said the spokesman, "we emphasize the dangers of overmedication that women, especially upper-middle-class women, face. Too often their physicians prescribe pills when some other kind of therapy is called for—usually psychotherapy. And we try to train women to gear up for their own independence, how to eliminate anger, how to eliminate guilt over children, and general survival skills.

"The center was not designed to be a celebrity spa, and it really isn't one. We have all kinds of people here, and they all follow the same general treatment program. But since so many celebrities have been coming here, we've tried to address their special needs. Living in the public eye creates special stresses and living with entourages where the celebrity is coddled and catered to are some of the things we try to address. We encourage them to stay in touch with 'key people' whenever they feel resolve waning, or circumstances overwhelming. That's why you see them at parties with people who are there sometimes just to keep that resolve firm. It works."

HOW THE Betty Ford Center began to attract celebrities has something to do with how Mrs. Ford has helped transform the public's perception about the nature of alcohol and drug treatment facilities.

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In 1978, at the request of her family, Mrs. Ford entered the Naval Hospital, which had been treating naval alcoholics for 13 years. She didn't enter as the result of a binge, or for detoxification, or even as an alcoholic. She issued a statement upon admission which said that as a result of years of muscle and nerve problems she "has been overmedicating herself." She insisted she was not a drug or alcohol abuser, but merely "chemically dependent." In her autobiography, *The Times of My Life*, she wrote, "For 14 years, I'd been on medications for pinched nerves, arthritis, and muscle spasms in my neck and I'd lost my tolerance for pills. If I had a single drink on top of the pills, it would make me groggy."

SOME WEEKS LATER, sober and enlisted in Alcoholics Anonymous, she emerged from the hospital, determined to do something for people, especially women, who were similarly afflicted. She felt some bitterness against the medical profession for treating women with pills and shots, and toward society for encouraging vast amounts of social drinking. (She cites "magic martinis" served in the White House.) The Betty Ford Center was born.

Enter the redoubtable Elizabeth Taylor in late 1983. Like many celebrities who drink or use drugs, Taylor was hospitalized for treatment under a pretense. She was ostensibly admitted to a California hospital for "a bowel obstruction." But during her stay she was persuaded by family and friends to enter the Betty Ford Center. The thought terrified her and her public relations staff until they talked things over with Betty Ford herself, who remains active as a counselor at the center. The message of the Betty Ford Center—"We are the abused, not really the abusers"—won Taylor over.

On December 5, 1983, Elizabeth Taylor checked into the Betty Ford Center. A press release was distributed that stated, "She selected the Betty Ford Center because she has great admiration for Betty Ford and believed her problem to be very similar to those experienced by Mrs. Ford in that much of her treatment stems from prescription drug administration over a period of years to combat her various medical problems. She expressed concern for the privacy of other patients undergoing treatment as well as for herself and hopes the press will respect the basic principles of the Center regarding the anonymity of all concerned."

Most celebrities issued similar statements as they went into the center—even though many of them weren't hooked on prescription drugs, but on street drugs like cocaine and heroin. It didn't matter. They all qualified as victims.

Mrs. Ford and Taylor took recovery very seriously, and each, shortly after entering her program, gave up the prone posture of victim. Taylor no longer blamed medications. She said she was a drunk. "Not being a drunk is the only way I'm going to stay alive," Taylor told *The New York Times* recently. "Drunk is a hard word, but I've had to be hard with myself to face it. A drunk is a drunk. Somebody who drinks too much is a drunk. Somebody that takes too many pills is a junkie. There's not a polite way of saying it." Addiction chic was born.

Hollywood, ever the home of trends, was fascinated by Taylor's admission. "She made being a drunk into a sickness," says a Beverly Hills PR man, "and she made it no sin to be sick." Shortly after being released from the center, Taylor's career took a turn for the better, especially on television. Along with cameos on the evening soap operas, she signed a $500,000 contract for a made-for-TV movie called *Malice in Wonderland*, in which she portrayed Louella Parsons, the Hollywood gossip who ruined the career of many a star by hinting in print at their liquor and drug problems.

And, not to neglect a point of paramount importance in Hollywood, she looked great. She lost 11 pounds in the center, and quickly lost 45 more. She began showing up at Michael Jackson concerts, at Prince concerts in a punk wig, on Broadway, and everywhere else. Other stars soon followed her to Betty's door.

A friend of Liza Minnelli—who entered the clinic last summer—says Minnelli did so "because of the publicity that Liz Taylor got. I think people felt it was nothing to be ashamed of. Elizabeth Taylor looked better when she came out and she told people she was feeling good for the first time in years. I think that it was Liza's feeling that it was O.K. to do it. It was not fashionable when Taylor did it, and Liza's a follower, not a leader."

Says one woman, a friend of a star who underwent therapy at the center with her friend, "The first thing I'd do in the morning is walk down the corridors of the three residential units to see 'Who's here today?' It was like being at Ma Maison on Friday lunch."

The other patients, wrestling with their problems and undergoing detoxification, were nonetheless star-struck. Some brought autograph books to the hospital, creating a difficult situation for a program where anonymity is a key principle of recovery.

Taylor solved the problem, though. Upon admission, each patient is given a volume called "The Blue Book," a kind of "Lives and Acts of the Apostles" of Alcoholics Anonymous that contains brief biographies and memoirs by A.A. members about their struggles. The authors are identified by first or nickname only. Taylor inscribed the end papers of these books with a mere "Love, Elizabeth." The patients cherish these volumes.

NOT ALL of the patients who enter the Betty Ford clinic recover. At Taylor's urging, Peter Lawford checked into the clinic. He told Hollywood reporter Malcolm Boyes soon afterward, "I really think Elizabeth saved my life by persuading me to check into the Betty Ford. Her entering there made a lot of people wake up to the fact that they had a problem . . . myself included. There is a joke going around town at the moment that you're nothing unless you've been to Betty Ford. But seriously, it is terrific that people like myself who do have a problem are facing it."

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Taylor also secured an acting job for Lawford, who was broke, in *Malice in Wonderland*. Lawford's deal called for him to do two days' work for $2,000, a pittance, but still cash. Six months later, just a day or two before he was to report for work, Lawford's wife found him drinking vodka and smoking a joint. "He seemed terrified of going in front of the camera," his wife told reporters. "When I found him he was completely out of it." Lawford was treated at a hospital, and sent off to work. He collapsed on the set, and within a few days was dead.

"Stopping an addiction," Taylor said in her *New York Times* interview after Lawford's death, "is basically an ongoing process. . . . Although the cure rate at Betty Ford is about 75 percent, it's not like seven weeks there undoes years of drugs and alcohol. You have to re-create what you learned every day. Staying clean becomes a dedication. If you need to rekindle your promise, you have key people to call. Or you repeat the A.A. Serenity Prayer whenever you need to. And treatment at the center doesn't always work. Peter Lawford was there the same time I was. . . . He didn't make it."

But, upon his death, Lawford achieved something thousands in Hollywood aspire to. His sad story received massive magazine and TV coverage. Says a *People* magazine editor, "Right now that's all you have to do to make the cover—enroll in the Betty Ford Center, or die within a few months of leaving. It's a guaranteed cover. It's that chic."

All the solutions will be unpleasant, and only America can impose them.

ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC DISASTER

BY JEFFREY SACHS

INFLATION RATES of several hundred percent a year occur when governments take on commitments that stretch well beyond their means. The politics of ending high inflation is therefore the battle of who will bear the burden of bringing commitments and means back into line. In the 1980s this debate is international, since today's overstretched governments almost always have foreign creditors who are asked to bear some of the costs of the stabilization. The governments of Argentina and Brazil, for example, have massive debts to international banks, and demands are rising in those countries for some relief from the banks. In the case of Israel, the U.S. government has played the banker's role in the past decade. So it is the American taxpayer who is now being pressed for further concessions. The possibility of unlimited aid from the United States has allowed the Israeli government to continue believing that pain-free stabilization is possible. This illusion must be shattered, for Israel's benefit as well as our own. New aid increases from the U.S. should be tied firmly to major reforms in the Israeli economy.

Hyperinflation is a market vote of no confidence in a government's finances. When taxes and borrowing can't cover a government's desired expenditures, governments resort to printing paper currency. The government gets the goods it desires, but at the cost of flooding the market with greater and greater amounts of paper money, each unit of which ends up buying fewer and fewer goods.

The mechanisms of hyperinflation have been the same throughout history, whether the money financing is to support Galtieri's war in the Falklands or Israel's twin burdens of social welfare and defense spending. For Germany in 1923, or Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Israel in 1985, rampant inflation results from a large budget deficit, a constellation of political forces that prevents tax increases or expenditure cuts, and an inheritance of heavy debt burdens on the government from past borrowing at home and abroad. (In Germany's case, there was also the burden of World War I reparations payments.) The inherited debt burdens the current budget with interest payments, and also sends the unmistakable signal that printing new money will be necessary to meet both current obligations and future bills when the existing debts come due.

Israel's current inflation is far from the world's worst in recent decades, though continuing political stalemate does not augur well for the future. The 1984 inflation rate of 374 percent put Israel in a solid third position, behind Bolivia (1,281 percent) and Argentina (627 percent). The famous hyperinflations of the 1920s reached rates of several thousand percent and beyond. But the lack of decisive Israeli action against inflation suggests that the situation will get worse before it gets better. Today's inflation is sharply higher than the plateau of about 125 percent during 1979-1983, which in turn was far above the average of about 50 percent during 1976-1979.

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Israel's fiscal crisis makes our own notorious problems look puny. Israel has been running central government budget deficits of more than 15 percent of GNP since 1977. By comparison, U.S. deficits have reached five percent of GNP only in the past two years. The Israeli deficits have been financed through a combination of money creation, domestic borrowing, foreign borrowing, and foreign aid. These have left the government struggling with a growing debt burden in addition to the problem of inflation. The debt of the Israeli government held by Israelis is a shocking 130 percent of GNP (compared to about 35 percent for the U.S.), and the government's debt held by foreigners is about 65 percent of GNP. At $16 billion, that amounts to a foreign public debt of $4,000 for every man, woman, and child in Israel. About two-thirds of that, $11.5 billion, is owed to the U.S. government.

The cause of Israel's budget deficits is enormous public expenditures rather than any reticence to tax. Public spending is a remarkable 70 percent of GNP, perhaps the highest in the capitalist world, and revenues are about 50 percent of GNP, also remarkably high by world standards. No other government in the world bears burdens as great as Israel's. Our own guns-and-butter problem pales in comparison. A tiny country in a region of implacable enemies, Israel spends more than 20 percent of GNP on defense, compared to about seven percent for the U.S. The public welfare burden absorbs another 20 to 25 percent of GNP. Among more traditional social welfare functions, this supports Israel's remarkable policy of sustenance for continuing waves of immigrants, most recently the rescue and absorption of 10,000 Ethiopian Jews. Israel also has a tradition of state subsidies to private industry. And added to these challenges are the enormous interest payments due every year on the government's past borrowing. Interest payments alone amount to almost 40 percent of the budget.

One reason Israeli governments have been slow to bite the bullet is fear that substantial budget cuts could induce a recession, with the serious implication of reduced immigration and increased emigration. Because of outmigration in the past few years, about one-tenth of Israel's population now lives abroad.

THE SAD FACT is that large budget deficits, the heavy military burden, and the resulting inflation have contributed to a deterioration of the economy that goes beyond the inflation problem. Ironically, instead of a sharp and short recession, which policymakers dread, there has been an even more damaging steady decline in the underlying strength of the economy. Economic growth, which averaged almost ten percent a year in the 1960s, is now barely two percent a year, and per capita GNP is hardly growing at all. Productivity growth in the business sector has also declined sharply. Government budget policies have helped to shield private consumers from the economic slowdown. The result is that investment, a major source of economic growth, has borne the heaviest burden. Investment spending has declined from 34 percent of GNP in 1973 to only 22 percent in 1983.

There are bright spots. Israel continues to develop high-technology industries that are vigorous competitors in world markets. The dynamic export sector is where Israel's future economic prospects are strongest.

SUCCESSIVE Israeli governments have been unwilling to face up to the fiscal crisis. Indeed, several finance ministers have denied the problem altogether. A favorite line of thinking, prominent in the policies of former finance minister Yoram Aridor in 1981-83, and again in the misguided "Package Deal" engineered by Prime Minister Shimon Peres last November, is that inflation is simply the result of prices chasing wages and wages chasing prices. If inflation were a matter of momentum, it would be simple enough to stop the process by intervening in the cycle and breaking one of the links. Better yet, break *all* the links in a "package deal" among labor, industry, and the government. No muss, no fuss, and certainly no budget cuts required!

Under Aridor, the strategy was to tie the value of the Israeli shekel to the dollar, thereby slowing the inflation of import prices and (with hope) domestic wages and prices as well. The main result of this strategy, though, was that imports became temporarily cheap, leading to a spending binge that dramatically increased Israel's foreign debt. This eventually forced a huge devaluation and an end to the strong currency strategy.

Peres's "package deal" also fell apart because it confused symptoms with underlying ailments. It is a good idea to coordinate a moderation of wage and price increases, if the attempt goes along with substantial budget reform and deficit reductions. But the "package deal" left the government budget out of the package. Like Aridor's policy, the results were favorable for a while, but then the policy collapsed. The annual inflation rate went from 752 percent in November 1984 to 55 percent in December and 85 percent in January 1985. With the prospect of pain-free disinflation, a near-euphoria set in. But then the inflation rate shot up again, to 359 percent in February, and reached more than 700 percent in April.

Many Israelis and much of the press blamed the breakdown on the government, for letting the foreign exchange value of the shekel sink too far, thus causing import prices to skyrocket and putting a strain on the agreed wage and price moderation. What these critics fail to comprehend is that a government with such an enormous deficit and such a large foreign debt has very little long-term choice about its currency's exchange rate. A government that is rapidly printing money inevitably will see its currency weaken compared to other currencies whose supply is increasing more slowly.

In any other country, Israel's budget policies would have led to a devastating economic crisis, with much sharper declines in living standards and perhaps even higher inflation than Israel has yet suffered. What has prevented these dire consequences so far is Israel's special relationship with the United States. But as inflation

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reaches 1,000 percent, a much deeper crisis cannot be ruled out. In the past decade the U.S. has given or lent Israel more than $15 billion. This year the administration has already proposed three billion dollars of new aid, with a possible supplementary loan of $1.5 billion. U.S. aid this year would then add up to more than $1,000 for every person in Israel, and more than 15 percent of Israeli GNP. And unless Israel's budget policies change, at least this much will be needed every year in the future.

The Israeli government argues that U.S. aid should be generous, and with few strings attached. This clearly suits its purpose of maintaining a precarious status quo in circumstances of political instability. But continued large-scale aid from the U.S. without serious reforms would be unwise for the U.S. and fraught with great hazards for Israel itself. Inevitably, American politicians will demand a growing role in Israeli strategic and political decisions in return for financing its government deficits. The resulting encroachments on Israeli sovereignty, as much as the growing weight of debt repayments, should be enough to steer both sides away from the present course.

ENDING HYPERINFLATION is never easy, and almost always requires a strong government leading the way. Many hyperinflations have ended only after the disaster of a military coup (Chile in 1973) or a civil war (Indonesia in 1965). Israel must find a democratic solution to its difficulties. Yet the current political situation is inauspicious, to say the least. The coalition government under Peres is deeply divided about almost everything. Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai is from the Likud, the junior coalition partner; and the Labor cabinet ministers use every opportunity to undercut his authority. His responsible calls for budget austerity generally have been ignored. Even when budget restraints have been enacted, the government has proven unable to keep spending in line with its own targets.

It's easy to sketch the broad outlines of necessary reform. The details, though, must ultimately be decided by elected politicians, not economists. Above all, the budget deficit must be sharply reduced, by at least ten percent of GNP. Given Israel's already enormous tax burden, most of the adjustment should come through spending cuts rather than tax increases.

One recent idea for enforcing fiscal austerity, developed by the U.S. and already adopted in Israel, is legislation limiting the authority of the Bank of Israel to print new money to support the budget deficit. In principle, the government will be forced elsewhere for its financing, and forced ultimately to reduce its borrowing. These restrictions will be phased in over several years, however, and it is still unclear whether this institutional change will have real bite.

A drastic tax measure that might be considered is a one-shot capital levy, perhaps on existing government debt. Right now domestic debt and foreign public debt add up to around 195 percent of GNP. The enormous interest payments on those debts may make it simply impossible to balance the budget through cuts in defense and social welfare spending alone. A capital levy used to pay off some debt would permit a major reduction in interest costs. If it worked, it would be preferable to yet higher income taxes or continued inflationary finance. The trick is to guarantee that the levy would not recur. (Otherwise, the result will be massive capital flight out of the country.) To make such a guarantee convincing, the onetime tax must be part of a package that conclusively eliminates the budget deficit.

THE SECOND ASPECT of any stabilization must be a low and realistic value for the shekel relative to the dollar. Shekels must remain inexpensive enough to keep Israel's dynamic export sector growing. After major budget cutting, there will be an initial sharp decline in aggregate demand for Israeli goods, with the government, today's big customer for output, having retired to the sidelines. To avoid unemployment, firms now selling goods to the government will have to reorient production to sell goods to the rest of the world. A competitive exchange rate is the best guarantee that labor can move into the export sector as government demand is reduced. Unfortunately, the reverse side of a cheap shekel is a high price for imports in Israel, and a consequent reduction in workers' living standards. But with an end to inflation, and with export-led growth, the prospects would be bright for a quick revival of living standards and renewed economic growth after the initial jolt.

How can such a desirable combination of policies be achieved? Answer: they should be insisted upon as a condition for new loans to the Israeli government. To its credit, the Reagan administration has made a valiant effort to impose just such "conditionality," as it is called. This effort is politically thankless, given the strong pressures in Congress to give new aid in large amounts without conditions. Already politicians are falling all over each other in attempts to be the most generous. Just one example is a new proposal by Senators Bob Kasten and Daniel Inouye to cut by more than half the interest charges on existing U.S. loans to Israel. That bit of largess would require a new four billion dollar appropriation this year. Such proposals make sense only in the context of fundamental reforms in Israel.

The U.S. political system may well prove incapable of enforcing any conditionality agreement with Israel. Is it likely that aid would be cut off if Israel failed to meet the conditions? A more realistic course is for the U.S. to make any aid above normal levels conditional on Israel's agreement to submit to the supervision of the International Monetary Fund. This is the standard requirement that we impose when renegotiating the debts of other countries. No doubt the IMF would prefer to leave this hot potato in our hands. After all, congressional pressure certainly reaches as far as IMF headquarters in Washington. But at least with the IMF in charge, the direct responsibility for overseeing Israel's painful adjustments would be beyond the corridors of Congress itself. This would be a healthy discipline for all parties involved. □

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STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Old Hands

The Home and the World
(European Classics)

Prizzi's Honor
(20th Century-Fox)

All his life the Bengali director Satyajit Ray has been associated with Rabindranath Tagore. The poet-novelist was a friend of Ray's family, and Ray went to an art school founded by Tagore. In 1961 Ray made a film about Tagore, but 18 years earlier, before the director's career had actually started, his first screenplay was an adaptation of Tagore's novel *The Home and the World*, for which he even scouted locations. This production did not materialize; 24 other films then intervened. Now at last comes Ray's film of *The Home and the World*. My next sentence is not the one I'd like to write: it ought to contain the word "masterpiece," but it can't. *The Home and the World* is a delicate work, made by a director who has learned much, discarded much, and grown; but it amounts to a thoroughly understood set of interweaving patterns rather than an overwhelming film.

As per the title, the patterns are personal and political. The time is around 1907, the place is East Bengal (now Bangladesh). Lord Curzon, the British viceroy, has split Bengal into two administrative units, separating Hindu from Moslem, in the belief that "divide and rule" will strengthen the imperial grip. We see something of Moslem protest, but we concentrate on Hindus. Some Hindus are activist, even terrorist, in anti-British feeling; some Hindus, equally opposed to the British, are afraid that a boycott will hurt the poor who depend on cheap British goods and will also inflame trouble with the Moslems.

One in the first group of Hindus is Sandip, played by Soumitra Chatterjee, a veteran of 12 Ray films. One in the latter is Nikhil, played by Victor Banerjee, lately seen as Dr. Aziz in *A Passage to India*. The differences between these two friends—Sandip, the leader of the activists, and Nikhil, the wealthy merchant with true humanitarian concerns—dramatize the changes in the world. The changes in the home come from those same humane, enlightening motives in Nikhil, who insists that his wife Bimala (Swatilekha Chatterjee) learn to speak English as he does and that she come out of purdah, that she meet his friends. From the alterations in home life comes an affair, brief but passionate, between Bimala and Sandip; from the turmoil in the world comes Nikhil's death.

One characteristic of Ray's films, not constant but recurrent, has been the microcosm, the small system that implicates great forces. *Charulata* (also taken from Tagore) and *The Chess Players* are two such works; *The Home and the World* is another. Most of the action takes place in a few rooms in the large home of the married couple, with the world swirling around it and finally obtruding. Much of the screen time is occupied by two characters only—some pairing of the three principals. The chamber play effect is heightened by Ray's use of the camera. He keeps close to his players most of the time, not literally in close-up but to convey the idea that *they* are conscious of their closeness to each other, that confinement of various sorts is on their minds. (Ray uses mirrors once in a while as if to suggest potential enlargement of the confines.) In one particularly subtle scene, the one in which Bimala first really becomes aware of Sandip's attractiveness, he is seated on the arm of a sofa in the middle of a large room and, as they talk, she moves from point to point in a wide circle around him, thus making him the new center of her life.

The film runs 130 minutes, and its length only underscores an early awareness in us. The director's love for his characters, the commitment of the actors to their work, the richness of physical detail don't compensate for the fact that we quite soon know what will happen. It isn't plot novelty or character idiosyncrasy that is missing, it is deepening. What we get, essentially, is a long statement of genuineness at more or less the same level. Time, sheer duration, inevitably either strengthens or weakens a film. Duration doesn't help *The Home and the World*.

John Huston had directed at least 15 films before Ray made his debut. In his long, fertile career—he is now 79—two elements that cannot be found are Ray's chief virtue and defect. Huston is not noted for profound authenticity; but he never neglects the idea of suspense. He has tackled films derived from plenty of serious sources—Melville, McCullers, Williams, the Bible(!)—but his best ones have usually been the ones where he has had fun, has had the most success in having various kinds of fun; *The Maltese Falcon*, *Across the Pacific*, *The Man Who Would Be King*, for examples.

So it was good news that he had moved from Lowry's *Under the Volcano* to a gangster novel by Richard Condon. (Screenplay by Condon and Janet Roach.) Still, though it turns out to be a murder comedy with laughs that make you simultaneously shake your head, *Prizzi's Honor* is not top Huston fun.

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Almost You. Almost you if you're under 30, that is. Yuppies nearing the end of youth. Smart, sharp, sexy. (Reviewed 6/3/85)

Mikey and Nicky. Relentless, dark drama about male bonding, conscious and otherwise, in the criminal world. John Cassavetes and Peter Falk in Elaine May script, directed by her. (1/1&8/77)

The Shooting Party. Patly symbolic story, set in England 1913, about approaching world catastrophe, but exquisitely acted and made. (6/17/85)

What Have I Done to Deserve This? Madrid today. This black comedy ought to have been blacker, still it cuts and slashes. (5/20/85)

SK

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Oh, he is still a very clever man. Who would have thought it possible to find a new angle at which to shoot furious sexual intercourse? Or to find a new way to show us a man getting a bullet in the head? Or to get laughs simply from insert shots of a transcontinental airplane flying either west or east? And he is fiendishly skillful in his use of his daughter, Anjelica, who looks like the finest bred mare in history, for satire and sex.

But *Prizzi's Honor* fumbles a bit before it sets its tone, and it is suffused with Mafia clichés. The aging don, head of the Brooklyn "family"—played by William Hickey, who wisely steers wide of anything like Brando—is now more a personage of ritual than of drama, exercising cruelty through the language of paternal care. The gang wars are old stuff and are not helped by the unlikely performances of John Randolph and Lee Richardson as the markedly un-Italian sons of the monkey-like old man.

To make matters worse, Jack Nicholson, as Randolph's son and a Mafia soldier, gives such a designedly stupid performance that he's incredible as a crown prince, and he wallows so utterly in Brooklynese—with a paralyzed upper lip—that he sounds less acclimated to America than his father. And Kathleen Turner, supposedly Polish-American, as an independent contractor (of killings, naturally) is so flashily blond in conspicuous clothes that she would be identifiable around a corner in a heavy fog. Her profession as a "hitter" seems unlikely. The romance between her and Nicholson, which is emotionally hot at the same time that the plot makes them enemies, is reminiscent of the Sam Spade-Brigid O'Shaughessy tensions in *The Maltese Falcon*, here carried to glandular extremes.

If more questions had been asked of this script, and had been answered, it might have made a pretty good sexual comedy in a general moral sewer, a kind of laugh-and-lust counterpart of *Mikey and Nicky*. As is, it coasts along pretty much on Huston's self-confidence and the fun he got out of making it. Unfortunately, this is more than we get out of watching it.

The strange history of human sexuality.

SEX IN THE WEST

BY LAWRENCE STONE

BIOLOGISTS HAVE taught us that it is the principal purpose of nature to reproduce the species, most commonly by sexual specialization. Human reproduction, however, is peculiar, indeed unique, in a number of ways. The first is that the enlarged size of the cranium makes it necessary for the human fetus to be born prematurely, relative to those of other primates, in order to pass through the birth canal. The infant is consequently especially helpless and unformed at birth, and remains almost entirely dependent on its parents or some adult for at least seven or eight years, and is not fully self-sufficient and sexually mature until about 14 years after birth. In order to survive it needs the combined attention of both parents for an exceptionally long time. The mother, consequently, needs to keep the father in the family. To do so she rewards him with on-demand sexual favors all the year round, having at some period in the distant past lost the periodic estrus of other mammals. This biological functionalism explains satisfactorily the evolution of the monogamous and fairly durable nuclear family.

Other critically important aspects of human sexuality, however, have no such functional utility. One is the capacity of the female to continue sexual activity decades after her reproductive capability has ceased. Another is her capacity for multiple orgasms, which not only serve no reproductive purpose but also far outmatch those of the male.

Given this situation, it might be conjectured that human beings live lives of uninhibited sexual pleasure, limited only by physical capacity, and therefore that sexuality has no history. This seems to be the view of a sociobiologist, Robin Fox, who in an essay in the collection by Philippe Ariès has gone so far as to claim that "a great deal that can be said about human sexuality can be disposed of as the sexual behavior to be expected of a large-bodied, large-brained, slow-breeding, omnivorous mammal." But things, alas, are far more complicated. Human beings are thinking animals; they are guided by moral codes and by fears of God's wrath, and consumed with emotions of guilt and shame, to say nothing of an apprehensive comprehension of death in the future and anxiety about mental and physical health in the present. In consequence, they have managed to erect around the simple physiological arrangements for perpetuating the species some of the most bizarre, complex, and glittering edifices of moral, religious, and medical prescriptions and taboos in the whole history of mankind. They are triumphs of man's ingenuity and almost limitless capacity for pseudo-scientific investigation, imaginative deduction, unverifiable speculation, and the formulation of wildly different codes of behavior.

Men and women have always invented elaborate refinements upon the simple 90-second act of penetration and ejaculation that fertilizes the egg, as required by nature. But it is a curious anomaly of modern life that the extraordinary history of the twists and turns of this acculturation process is almost unknown to the most sophisticated and widely read in this sex-obsessed society of ours. We have a vague idea, derived from Freud, that we are especially liable to sexual dysfunctions and anxieties because of the weight of our Judeo-Christian traditions, but just what they

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were, and when they developed, and what came before them, we mostly do not know. There is something very illogical about the way we scrutinize with so much attention our individual sexual history on the psychoanalyst's couch, but inquire so little about our collective sexual history as heirs—and prisoners—of an ancient sexual culture.

As a result, as Jean-Louis Flandrin has pointed out, the long and weighty history of sexuality that still presses so heavily upon us is largely ignored by sociologists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, and sexologists, who saturate the public with their advice on this absorbing topic. A prime reason for this neglect of history is that only in the last decade or so have historians begun to excavate that past, delving into both the values propounded by philosophers, theologians, and moralists, and the actual reality of human behavior insofar as it can be reconstructed.

The libido has always been subjected to the conflicting influences of ascetic repression and erotic stimulation. Both have coexisted in competition with each other in all cultures, but their relative strength and influence have varied enormously from period to period, and within the same period from class to class. On the one hand sexual libertinism, until recently largely confined to a wealthy and indolent elite, often concentrated around a court, has invented a remarkable panoply of tricks and devices, including masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, and even physical aids and sexual toys from vibrators to ben wa balls to dildos. Erotic art, handbooks, and pornographic literature have been produced by every higher civilization from ancient Egypt, China, classical Greece and Rome down to Japan, India, and the early modern and modern West.

But having provided itself with all these artificial stimuli, the human species has then proceeded to enmesh the simple act of sexual reproduction with a massive array of moral and aesthetic injunctions, ascetic codes of conduct, and theological laws and prescriptions of

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the most extraordinary complexity, variety, and severity. For long periods of time, the full moral, administrative, and judicial powers of church and state have been directed toward controlling the libido and directing it into strictly delimited channels. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the history of sexuality is a long and complicated history, deeply affected by public policy, law, morality, religion, community attitudes and customs, to say nothing of viral change such as the introduction of syphilis into Europe in the late 15th century or technological change such as improving contraceptive devices from the 17th century.

THE DISTANCE we have traveled in our attitudes toward sexuality in the West over the last 2,500 years can be illustrated by some stark comparisons. First, to a young male citizen of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., it was perfectly proper and moral to use the body of a male or female slave for any sexual pleasure that took his fancy, whether it be sodomy, fellatio, or whatever. Today almost the only taboo in the modern sexologist's book is the sexual use of another without allowing the latter any pleasure or profit, and without the latter's free consent.

Second, to the ancient world of Greece and Rome, men—and it was above all a masculine society—were regarded as naturally bisexual. No distinction was made between the love of boys and the love of women. This was simply a question of taste, about as significant as preferring coffee or tea for breakfast. The crucial distinction in law and morality was between those who took the active roles and those who took the passive roles—the penetrators as opposed to the penetrated. This concept effectively degraded submissive boys, women, and slaves of both sexes, and elevated active men, regardless of their gender preference. To us, gender preference is all-important, and the distinction between the active and the passive roles of only minor significance.

Third, in the late 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, doctors were unanimous in telling their contemporaries that masturbation was extremely dangerous to their health, while theologians were equally insistent that it was a mortal sin. Today sexologists tell us that masturbation is not only harmless, both physically and morally, but even an essential step toward the "orgasmic imperative" that now dominates our society. One writer in the Ariès volume quotes the claim that "masturbation . . . makes it possible to have satisfactory sexual relationships later on."

Fourth, from St. Jerome in the fourth century A.D., to the Spanish theologian Thomas Sanchez in the 16th century, to the English propagandist and novelist Daniel Defoe in the 18th century, it was generally held that passionate sexual love between spouses within marriage was not only indecent but positively sinful. St. Jerome claimed that "nothing is more impure than to love one's wife as if she were a mistress"; he called it adultery. Defoe denounced it as "matrimonial whoredom." The reason for this was that Christian ascetic moralists viewed all sex, except for the single purpose of procreation, as immoral. It should not be indulged in for the gratification of pleasure, or even to cement marital affection. And yet today we regard sexual love as essential to a good marriage and its absence as grounds for divorce.

Perhaps it should be pointed out that these modern sexologists with their apparently liberating doctrines are in fact erecting a new dichotomy of mind and body to replace the ancient ones of the pagan world and Christianity. André Béjin has pointed out that "present day norms tend to provoke a conflict between immediate surrender to the demands of the senses, and an increased conscious mastery of the organic processes. . . . One must . . . abandon oneself to sensation, without ceasing to submit one's actions to a rational calculation of 'sexual expedience.' " He concludes, gloomily, that we are witnessing "the surreptitious re-entry of this antithesis, and all that flows from it, chiefly asceticism and intellectualism." If this is true, which I think it is, then we are still as hog-tied to the dualism of the spirit and the flesh, the mind and the body, as was any Early Father in the Syrian desert 1,700 years ago. After all this effort to create a culture of pure sensuality, the body is still, in the 1980s, a prisoner of the mind. Thus the history of sexuality is not the history of what people actually did, which inevitably is a somewhat boring topic, since the options are limited by the structure of the human body. It is concerned, rather, with something much more interesting, which is the ideas that have

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

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
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dominated and controlled this activity and the social systems that have resulted from the adoption of these ideas and patterns of behavior.

IT IS CLEAR from the historical record that sexuality has always been problematic, to widely varying degrees, for every unit in the social system from the individual to the state. For a woman it has been problematic, partly because of the cultural pressures for premarital virginity and marital fidelity to which she has usually been subjected, and partly because of the severe social and economic consequences of an illegitimate pregnancy. For a man, sexuality has been problematic since it is a perpetual challenge either to his virility or to his powers of self-control. For 2,000 years doctors have warned that the semen is a precious fluid, excessive loss of which will bring on almost every disease to which mankind is heir. For the family it has been problematic since it is through legalized sexual union in marriage that family property, prestige, and power is transmitted, accumulated, or diminished. Since a woman's virginity has in most societies been her strong card in the marriage market, along with her face and her fortune, many societies have virtually imprisoned their womenfolk in the home, and married them off as soon as they reached sexual maturity.

For the neighborhood, sexuality is problematic since any adulterous connection, or any rape or seduction of young boys or girls, is liable to lead to violence and civil disorder. For the community, the confinement of the sexual drive within legalized channels is also of prime importance, both to avoid social conflict and to limit the number of deserted wives and illegitimate children who of necessity will become an economic burden upon the public funds. To the church—especially the Christian and Moslem churches—sexuality and its control serve as a paradigm for other moral and spiritual qualities, and is frequently monitored with the most extreme care, both to reduce the total level of sexual passion and sensual worldly pleasure and to channel sexuality into the legitimate reproduction of the species. Sexuality is problematic for the state, since it has the responsibility to transform the injunctions of religion into enacted law; to enforce that law; and also to ensure that the population reproduces itself and provides a constant supply of young males for war. Thus there is no social unit, political institution, or moral code that is not in some way deeply involved in the simple act of sexual congress.

The writings under review fall into four groups: those that deal with sexuality in the West in general; those that are concerned with the ancient world and with the great transition in the late antique period to the new ethic of sexual austerity; those that trace the story through the Christian Middle Ages; and those that deal with the new transformation of the early modern period from the Renaissance through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation to the 18th-century Enlightenment; and finally those that struggle with the 19th-century combination of intense prudery and an equally intense scientific investigation driven by "the desire to know," as Michel Foucault has aptly called it. Only the astonishing sexual revolution of the middle to late 20th century is missing from the literature under review.

BEFORE discussing what these writings tell us, it is first necessary to enter certain caveats. If anything is certain about the history of sexuality, it is that in no society has a single cultural norm been universally observed, or even paid lip service to. In any complex society there has always been a variety of subcultures of sexual behavior. As Guido Ruggiero points out, there is always a licit sexual culture side by side with an illicit one liable to persecution and punishment, and in between the two a gray area, often a very large one, in which the two come together.

Moreover, at every epoch there has been a dialogue between the competing cultures of eroticism and asceticism. Sometimes one and sometimes the other has for a while obtained the upper hand, but perhaps more frequently each has exercised moral hegemony over certain sectors of the population, while competing for power to control all the others. For example, attitudes to fornication and adultery are directly related to attitudes to the idea of marital sexual monopoly; rape has sometimes led to marriage.

In early modern and modern Western societies, there appear to have been at least three major class cultures of sex. The working class has had a culture of direct and crude male-dominated sexuality, without much foreplay or erotic sophistication. Since no property is involved at this marginal social level, there has always been much casual concubinage or so-called marriages based on vague promises. The middling classes, when we can glimpse them, have tended to be provident and inhibited, an attitude consonant with their thrifty and calculating economic behavior. The elite, especially at courts, have tended to be promiscuous and have sometimes practiced a highly sophisticated and variegated sexual libertinism. In most societies there has been a distinct homosexual subculture, and in one—classical Athens—a special kind of idealized homosexuality may actually have predominated over heterosexuality in terms of moral esteem if not of practice. As will be seen, the degree to which homosexuality has been admired, ignored, tolerated, or viciously suppressed has varied enormously over all ages.

A MORE serious problem is that of evidence. At all times there has been a large—sometimes a gigantic—gap between the prescriptions of theologians, philosophers, and moralists supported in part by the enacted laws and actual sexual behavior. Things may be proclaimed as immoral and prohibited by law, which in practice everyone is doing with a clear conscience, rather like exceeding the speed limit today. This difficulty can be overcome (if at all) only by studying the wide variety of evidence available, in full recognition that each has its own limitations.

The writings of theologians, philosophers, and moralists tend to display the world in stark tones of black and white—divinely ordained sexuality, or Sodom and Gomorrah. On the other hand, moral codes, usually derived from religion, have had enormous impact both on internalized culture and external repressive measures. In addition to these theological injuctions, medical ideas—usually false ones—have had enormous effect upon behavior. One enduring medical belief has been the gross physical harm done by an excessive expenditure of semen by males. This has resulted in such diverse practices as the emphasis laid upon sexual moderation in the classical world, the anti-masturbation panic of the 18th and 19th centuries West, and in China the careful cultivation of special techniques of intercourse without ejaculation for the conservation of Yang. Another medical belief prevalent in the West at all times except the 19th centu-

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ry has been in the almost limitless lubricity of women. Such medical theories have dominated whole civilizations and the private lives of many who lived in them.

Diaries and letters are useful, but those that deal with sexual matters are few in number, almost entirely the work of men, almost entirely drawn from elite society, and almost certainly atypical even of their sex or class in their obsessive concern with such matters. Thus writing the history of Victorian bourgeois sexuality on the basis of one or two diaries of blissfully orgasmic women, buttressed by heavy Freudian theory, as attempted by Peter Gay, is a very dubious enterprise.

Perhaps the most useful evidence of all is that of prosecutions for sexual deviance in the courts of law, since this links the enacted law, and the moral attitudes of the judges, with actual behavior. In his path-breaking book about sexuality in Renaissance Florence, Ruggiero has used such records to draw a careful and convincing picture of changing behavior and changing attitudes among different social groups from the records of law enforcement against sexual deviants. From a study of the illicit, it is possible to draw the boundaries of the licit. Prosecution, he argues, does not *create* boundaries, but it "helps to reify the perception of boundaries." These boundaries are usually internalized, determined more by custom and tradition than by the power of repression. The successful use of legal records by Ruggiero and by K. J. Dover should provide models for future scholarship in this area. Similarly the records of divorce court cases, if they are described in sufficient detail, throw a vivid light upon the values and attitudes of protagonists, witnesses, and judges. If special care is taken to study the rhetoric used in court, reliable conclusions can be drawn about sexual *mentalités* in the past.

There is also erotic art and literature. This may be more revealing about eccentric and illicit sexuality than the common and the licit. It may be part of a religious cult, say the cult of the phallus in Greece or the tantra in India or Taoism in China, and it may be subject to stylistic and even technical conventions. For example, it is much easier for an artist explicitly to depict a couple in the rear entry position than the missionary, which may account for the heavy preponderance of the former in the erotic art of most times and places—the Orient being an exception to this generalization. And last, the writings and artifacts were usually made for an exclusive and possibly a secretive elite, and may well bear no relation to the views or behavior of the population at large—witness, for example, the exotic undergrowth of English elitist pornographic literature of the highest sexual sophistication and obscenity at the height of mid-Victorian sexual prudery.

BY THE BRYGOS PAINTER, 500-475 B.C., FROM 'SEX OR SYMBOL' BY CATHERINE JOHNS

In certain cases—especially that of classical Greece—an embarrassingly large amount of the surviving evidence comes from erotic vase paintings and the semi-pornographic jokes of the writers of stage comedy such as Aristophanes.

Finally, virtually all this evidence, except for some litigation, was produced by men. Direct evidence of women's views about sexuality in the past is almost entirely lacking, and we are left to assume, perhaps wrongly, that they conformed to the stereotypes ascribed to them by men. That stereotype was for a long time a pejorative one since the woman is the passive partner in the sexual act. This led St. Augustine to the astonishing conclusion that "the body of a man is as superior to that of a woman as the soul is to the body." In the light of all these manifest defects in the evidence, Ariès rightly concludes that "it is hard for the historian to penetrate the silence that reigns over vast areas of human life."

If the records are inadequate, the modern models of historical interpretation are hardly more helpful. The pressure-cooker model of modern sex investigators such as Alfred Kinsey, or sex therapists such as Masters and Johnson, treats sexuality as a matter of "outlets" or orgasms, and not at all as the end product of a complex web of cultural, religious, and legal prescriptions whose origins go far back in historic time. Freudian theory hypothesizes that sex is so powerful a drive that it dominates our unconsciousness, and is only with the greatest difficulty kept within bounds by the restraints of civilization. These restraints, however, are often the cause of serious psychological disturbances. This may perhaps be true of certain classes and culture, although it posits the stark alternatives of uninhibited sexual freedom or civilization,

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which historically do not seem to have been the only options. Clinical Freudianism, with its stress on penis envy, early incestuous experiences (real or imagined), and the Oedipus complex, looks increasingly like the product of a Victorian, central European, middle-class, male chauvinist society. Some of its major hypotheses may well not apply to other times and other places.

THE most ambitious attempt to write a total history of sexuality has been that of the late Michel Foucault; three volumes have already been published and a fourth is yet to come. Like all his work, it is primarily a highly sophisticated philosophical discourse based upon prescriptive texts, but in this case the historical context has been pushed even further into the background than in his earlier writings. Volumes II and III, which are concerned with Greece and Rome, provide an extremely valuable, if somewhat lengthy and repetitious, analysis of philosophical discourses, pushing one stage further the previous findings of other scholars in the field, such as Dover and Paul Veyne. But Foucault's neglect of historical context is also carried a stage further. He does not inform his readers who were the authors of the texts he dissects with such skill, what were their formative experiences, sometimes even what century they lived in or where they came from in the far-flung Roman Empire from Scotland to the Euphrates. Nor is there any hint of the size or nature of their readership, nor any attempt to discriminate between enormously influential texts such as those of Plato, Galen, or St. Augustine and those of obscure writers such as Artemidorus Maximus or Musonius Rufus. Nor are we offered any hint of the causes of the great revolution in attitudes in the late antique period, except a halfhearted repetition of the tentative hypothesis of Veyne.

The weakness of such a purely textual analysis of philosophical ideas has been set out by John Boswell:

> It is almost fatally tempting for the historian, like the moral theologian, to pick out those fathers and doctrines which eventually gained universal acceptance as orthodox. . . . The historian is apt to accept the notion that a particular opinion triumphed because this or that influential thinker espoused it, disregarding the fact that many equally prominent theologians . . . may have held contrary views.

Boswell concludes that "it is, for example, naive to think that the deep hostility to homosexuality in Western culture derived merely from the writings of a few church Fathers." He also points out the vast gulf between theory and practice, which makes it so dangerous to focus exclusively on prescriptive texts to construct a history. Thus he correctly observes of St. Augustine's sexual ethic that "Christian society has in the main ignored it and at many points rejected it openly." The gap between the official theology of sexuality and the practice of sex is often a chasm.

There is a clear consensus in all the books under review that sexuality has had a long and astonishingly complicated history, intimately linked to family structure, social systems, religious beliefs, clerical controls, and civic and state power. The Moral Majority is quite right to see the radical changes in attitudes to, and practice of, sexuality in America in the last quarter of a century as symbolic of much wider and more fundamental changes in our society, culture, and polity.

A GREAT DEAL is now known about sexuality in the classical Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., thanks to the brilliant detective work of Dover on homosexuality, the revelation of the intense stress on the dominance of free males over women by Eva Keuls, and the patient and sophisticated study of the ideas of the philosophers in the second volume of Foucault's unfinished work. All three add up to a coherent composite picture. It emerges that almost all the key concepts concerning the moral economy of sexuality in classical Greece were entirely different from our own. In addition to dividing the species into those who played the active role in sex and those who played the passive, the Greeks saw a second great division between those who controlled their appetites and practiced sex in moderation, and those who were incontinent or orgiastic. This rule was based on considerations of good health and moral virtue, which are explored in great detail by Foucault. Our modern division between those men who are faithful to their wives and those who are not simply did not exist in classical Greece, any more than did that between heterosexuals and bisexuals or homosexuals.

The sexual culture of Greek male citizens of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was unusual, since in addition to the acceptance of bisexuality as the norm, it was dominated by an idealized form of pederasty. The bond between an older free man and a pubescent free boy was regarded as the highest and purest form of love. This may have been a relatively new development, since there is no explicit hint of it in Homer, not even in the relationship on and off the battlefield between Achilles and Patroclus. On the other hand, this omission can perhaps be explained by the fact that Homer and his audience simply took the sexual bond for granted.

The classical Greek idealization of pederasty was hedged about by all sorts of quite rigid taboos. Anal and oral intercourse were regarded as crude and vulgar, and sexual contact took place face to face between the thighs of the boy, thus obliging the man to crouch in a most awkward position (which looks guaranteed to bring on a backache). If the boy allowed himself to be penetrated anally, he supposedly forfeited his rights to citizenship. Second, the boy was expected to obtain no sexual pleasure from the encounter. Third, it was shameful for a boy of a good family to take money for his services, although he certainly expected rich presents. Fourth, the boy should only surrender his body to a worthy suitor, whom he admired and who would provide him with intellectual conversation and education and moral support. Not surprisingly, therefore, a number of vase paintings depict a handsome boy rudely rejecting the none-too-delicate advances of a bearded man, which usually take the form of one hand stroking his beardless face and the other his nude limp genitals.

THIS was not, however, an exclusively homosexual society. It was a bisexual one, in which the lovers married and had children in the normal way. But the women were confined to the home, while the men and boys strutted about half-naked in the sunlit streets, directing their love and enthusiasm to pederastic flirtations in the gymnasium. It was a fragile cultural construct, limited to male freeborn citizens and hedged around by elaborate conventions. It is hardly surprising that by the late fourth century it seems to have been in full decay. By the time Aristophanes was writing, the society he depicted was basically heterosexual, and the homosexual aspects of it were

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pushed more and more into the background. The plot of *Lysistrata* works only because there were no alternative sexual outlets for men except for the striking women. Even the old moral taboos surrounding pederasty seem to have been undermined, for Aristophanes is full of crude, if hostile, jokes about male sodomy. Finally, by the third century B.C., Dover sees the growth of an "inhibited respectability," perhaps a foretaste of the pagan and Christian asceticism that was later to sweep across the Mediterranean world.

Keuls has focused her attention on the women of Athens, the neglected wives, favored hetaerae (mistresses), and sexually exploited female slaves. There is no doubt that there was something very odd about classical Greek sexuality as displayed visually in vase paintings, discussed in speeches in lawsuits, and obliquely or bluntly referred to by the later comic playwrights such as Aristophanes. In art, there is a repetitious emphasis on the erect phallus, which is obsessive by the standards of any other known society. This is shown not only by the extremely numerous vase paintings but also by the two huge stone phalli, parts of which still stand on their original short pillars in the sacred enclosure at Delos, now passed daily by hordes of unobservant tourists.

16TH-CENTURY GERMAN WOODCUT, COURTESY OF THE GRANGER COLLECTION

We have been taught to regard Periclean Athens as the cradle of much that is most admirable about Western civilization: classical art and architecture, philosophy and tragic drama of the highest quality, and courageous victory by a tiny democracy over a mighty oriental tyranny. Keuls sees it quite differently, as the despotic rule of male chauvinist sex-crazed "phallocrats," who ruthlessly exploited slaves of both sexes for sexual purposes, neglected and imprisoned their wives, and only treated their mistresses—the hetaerae—with any degree of affection. According to Keuls, their ruthless and exploitative treatment of boys, slaves, women, and other city states was not only similar in nature but causally linked. Drunk with male power and with the imperial aggression that accompanies such a system of values, the Athenian phallocrats first committed deliberate genocide on the helpless Greek inhabitants of Melos, who merely asked to stay neutral in the Peloponnesian war, and then brought about the ruin of Athens by a reckless military adventure, the ill-fated expedition to Sicily. Keuls backs up her study with 345 illustrations, mostly of erect phalli. They form an impressive spectacle, and she makes a fairly convincing case for a crudely male-oriented society that treated its women and slaves peculiarly abominably and then foundered in military adventurism.

But Keuls fails to demonstrate a direct linkage of the macho sexuality of the Athenian male citizens to militarism and imperial expansion. Still less does she prove her farfetched theory that the sensational scandal of the mutilation of the herms (stone pillars with a male head and a projecting phallus that stood outside most Athenian front doors) was the work of a group of feminist and pacifist women, protesting against both sexism and militarism. She describes Zeus as "the master rapist," sees Greek temples as boxlike vaginae surrounded by phallic pillars, and even a purse full of money as an "economic phallus." The purchase of a woman's favors she calls "rape by money." She positively hates Athenian men, and greets the final defeat of Athens by Sparta in 404 B.C. with the sardonic comment: "The Attic genius had lost its penis." After a while, it becomes evident that there is an obsessive, even manic, quality about Keuls's interpretation of Greek culture exclusively in phallic terms, which renders implausible her tight linkage between the undoubted Athenian fixation upon the phallus and the exploitative oppression of women and slaves on the one hand, and ruthless imperial military aggression on the other. This is a deeply flawed book; still, despite its excess and absurdities, after reading it and examining its illustrations no one can ever quite feel the same again about Periclean Athens.

Sexuality in ancient Rome followed the same basic rules as in Athens four centuries before. Bisexuality was taken as normal, and the main divisions were between the active and passive role players, and between a man's self-controlled use or his intemperate abuse of his sexual powers. The Greek idealization of pederasty with free upper-class boys had vanished, and such relations were now confined to slave boys. This was apparently still extremely common, and Gibbon claimed that during the first two most flourishing centuries of the great Roman empire only one em-

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peror (Claudius) was not either bisexual or homosexual. No one objected when Hadrian had statues of his boy lover Antinous erected all over the empire after his premature death. Marital fidelity was the ideal, but slaves continued to be kept and used for sexual purposes. Mistresses were common, and to judge from fragments of literature and the frescoes at Pompeii, brothels abounded. If we are to believe Petronius's satiric story of *Trimalchio's Feast*, every form of polymorphic perversity was practiced not only by the court and landed elite, but also by the rich commercial classes.

BY THE SECOND century A.D. there appeared the first rumblings of a major revolution in sexuality, among both pagan philosophers and the Christian Fathers. The Stoics and the Neoplatonists were the first to urge not merely moderation and self-control, but sexual asceticism. Seneca argued that "pleasure is a vulgar thing, petty and unworthy of respect, common to dumb animals." Some Christian Fathers, such as St. Jerome, preached that *all* sexual pleasure was sinful and to be avoided. Above all, man should learn to control not only his bodily lusts, but his very thoughts, so that both body and mind were free from temptation. As Foucault points out, there was a major shift from an aesthetic of sexual pleasure to a purification of desire.

Stoics and Christians not only advocated a new sexual austerity, they also combined to erect a new dichotomy, this time between attitudes to a wife and attitudes to other women. St. Jerome copied Seneca in arguing that the duties of a wife were to be a fertile breeder, a good mother, and a prudent housekeeper, but that sexual passion should play no part in the relationship with her husband. This is hardly surprising, since until fairly recent times the purpose of marriage had nothing to do with romantic love, sexual passion, or even necessarily friendship. It was a business arrangement between two propertied families for the production of legitimate children to inherit property; for the extension of both families' political connections; for the social placement and status enhancement of women; and for capital transfers between families through the dowry. Among the lower classes, where there was no dowry to give or property to inherit, Veyne claims that it was hardly worth the trouble to go through so formal a ceremony.

As is well known, St. Paul put marriage far below virginity in terms of morality, a mere reluctant compromise to deal with the problem of concupiscence. Along with this went the development, borrowed from the Stoics, of the idea of the indissolubility of the marriage bond, a doctrine that lasted until the 19th century. The Christians also insisted on marital fidelity by the husband as well as the wife, a genuinely new idea that would have deeply shocked the Greeks, and which from that day to this has been honored as much in the breach as the observance. In his brilliant summary of a complex story, Boswell rightly describes these changes in ways of thinking about sexuality, sexual pleasure, and marriage as "this crucial transition in Western history." It was one that had some strange consequences. Thus Peter Brown has shown how the early Christian bishops married and begot children who would carry on the priestly functions, and then at about 40 adopted "virginity" and thereafter lived lives of abstemious chastity.

The causes of the social diffusion of this great revolution in Western thought, however, remain obscure. This is not a subject that interests Foucault, who as a philosopher was only concerned with the texts. Veyne suggests that it is to be associated with the transformation of the senatorial class into a disciplined and obedient imperial bureaucracy; it is thus a psychological reaction to a social situation. The same quest for disciplined respectability was, he suggests, as attractive to third-century Roman aristocratic bureaucrats as it was to 19th-century bourgeois businessmen. In another article, however, Veyne undermines his own argument by talking about the rise of a "popular and ascetic morality." If it was "popular" it can hardly be attributed to the formation of a senatorial imperial bureaucracy.

AN ALTERNATIVE sociological explanation is offered by Boswell, who suggests that what happened was the overthrow of the more tolerant and hedonistic values associated with city life, reinforced by the rise to power of emperors and theologians whose origins and ideas were those of the distant provinces in the now enormous empire. For Boswell, the new asceticism thus grew out of the collapse of the urban economy and culture in the late Roman period, and their replacement by the austere beliefs of a conservative provincial countryside. Neither of these explanations is entirely convincing, but each is at least plausible. Either is preferable to no explanation at all, except that somehow a wholly new ascetic sexual morality preached by pagan Stoics and Christian Fathers replaced the older tradition of tolerant hedonism. Could it be that when things began to go badly wrong, as was clearly happening in late antique politics, society, and economy, men and women took to ascetic morality and mystical religion as an explanation of, and salvation from, their growing misfortunes?

Whatever the cause of this great moral mutation, which at the moment remains obscure, the result was a shift from a bisexual world divided between the penetrators and the penetrated, to one divided between reproductive heterosexuality and sterile homosexuality; from one of marriage as a relatively rare legal condition undertaken for purposes of property disposal and inheritance, to marriage as a normal condition of that great majority of mankind unable to live a life of total chastity; from one of ethically neutral male bisexual promiscuity in marriage, to an ideal of male and female marital fidelity; from the moral acceptability of the use of slaves against their own wills as sexual playthings, to a new universal code of sexual behavior no longer dependent upon the status of the parties involved; and finally from incest as merely a sin to incest as against nature. "The ascetic," concludes Veyne, "is a dandy of morality."

NATURALLY the working out and implementation of this new ascetic morality took many centuries to accomplish. It was not until the 12th century that the church finally managed to establish that priests could not marry, since they were supposed to practice chastity; that marriage was finally declared indissoluble; and, most surprising of all, that the test of a legally binding marriage was declared to be not the blessing of the church nor the will of the parents but the free consent of both spouses. This last was a doctrine that ran directly counter to the practice of the elite laity, who had used—and went on using—the arranged marriage to accumulate property and extend political

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connections. The result was a 500-year tussle between canon law theory and secular elite practice. Similarly, the Christian injunction that marriage involved sexual fidelity by the husband as well as the wife also ran directly counter to secular practice, and it, too, has been as often violated as observed.

Boswell demonstrates that throughout the first 1,200 years of Christianity there was no clear-cut theological condemnation, and certainly no energetic legal repression, of male homosexuality. It had not yet become *the* "unnatural" vice. More astonishing still is his discovery in the 12th century not only of courtly love, which we already knew about, but of a major explosion of overtly homosexual literature. Boswell claims that homoeroticism, whether sublimated or physical, was for a while "the animating force of most Christian life-styles." This may be exaggerated, but it certainly affected some of the most famous bishops and saints of the period, such as St. Anselm or St. Aelred of Rievaulx. At a more popular and more openly physical level, there is evidence that specialized male brothels were available in north-central France in Paris, Chartres, Orléans, and Sens, while a common philosophical topos was a debate between Ganymede and Helen about the relative sexual attractiveness to men of boys and women.

This short flowering of sexual tolerance came to a shattering halt in the 13th century, when a new and far more ferocious wave of repression of all forms of deviance descended upon Europe. There was vigorous official repression by church and state of all forms of religious, moral, and sexual deviance, including Albigenses, heretics, Templars, Jews, usurers, witches, adulterers, and homosexuals.

There was one striking exception, however, to this tidal wave of repression. One variety of what is usually regarded if not as deviant then at least as sinful sex, namely the use of prostitutes, was not merely tolerated in the late Middle Ages. It was positively encouraged by the organization of municipally licensed brothels in formally designated red-light districts, a fact which is now beyond dispute, since Leah Lydia Otis and Jacques Rossiaud and Ruggiero have all independently come to the same conclusions.

TEMPTING TO RUIN!
HOW GOTHAM'S PALACES OF SIN ARE GARRISONED OUT OF THE HOVELS—
THE GAUDY SPIDER SPREADING HER WEBS FOR THE FLIES WHO
MAKE HER LOATHSOME TRADE PROFITABLE.

FROM THE 'POLICE GAZETTE,' 1882.
COURTESY OF THE GRANGER COLLECTION

The prime reason for this exception would appear to have been the danger to social peace created by the fact that the average male age of marriage had risen to the late 20s or even early 30s, some ten or 15 years after puberty. All towns were faced with the problem of calming roving bands of sexually frustrated single men, and brothels were regarded as useful, indeed necessary, tranquilizers for bachelors. They relieved sexual frustrations and so both avoided public riots and saved respectable matrons from the threat of gang rape in the streets. These municipal brothels had an additional attraction for married men. A visit to one of them, unlike one to an unlicensed brothel, gave immunity to the client from a charge of adultery in ecclesiastical law, and the consequent obligation of penance, and also from prosecution in a royal court. Finally, the city fathers made money out of the business.

The only limitation placed upon the practice of the profession was that the brothels were forbidden to do business during church services on Sundays and during Holy Week. By the 15th century, almost every town in southern France or Italy seems to have had a licensed brothel, while villages were taken care of once a week by scheduled visits by a licensed prostitute from a nearby town. As for the prostitutes themselves, they were treated as respectable members of society, like any other guild, and were allowed to take a formal part in civic processions and festivities.

In the 16th century, however, everything changed once more. All over Europe, the towns shut down their licensed brothels and embarked on a vigorous drive to suppress all forms of extramarital sex. By 1562 one-fifth of all the criminal cases coming before the courts in Calvinist Geneva dealt with fornication, while the Counter-Reformation was not far behind in its puritanical zeal. Town and village authorities were empowered to break into and search houses where they suspected that fornication might be taking place. Convicted prostitutes were whipped half-naked through the streets until the blood ran down their backs. Their clients were made to stand in church on Sunday on a platform in front of the whole congregation, dressed in a white sheet and holding a candle, a public shame punishment many would willingly pay large sums to avoid.

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At the same time every effort was taken to enforce sexual segregation upon the unmarried, and to reduce the amount of consensual unions, concubinage, and pre-nuptial cohabitation. Children of the middle and upper classes, after the age of 14 or so, were safely shut away behind the walls of boarding schools and colleges under the watchful eyes of bachelor clerics. By the late 16th century, this new wave of repression was fully functioning, both in Protestant and in Catholic countries. It enlisted the combined repressive efforts of state and church, and was directed by political, religious, municipal, and village leaders.

What caused this remarkable shift in public opinion and policy toward extramarital sexuality? No one really knows. A minority movement for the suppression of prostitution was evident in the late 15th century, so that the emotional fury engendered by the Reformation merely built on an existing trend of opinion, just as the sexual asceticism of the early Church Fathers had built on the writings of the pagan Stoics. What was new was the theological emphasis that sexuality henceforward should be strictly confined within marriage, which now consequently became the prime focus of heterosexual love. "Holy matrimony" now replaced chastity as the Christian ideal. As Ruggiero shows, the new stress on marriage appears as early as 1450 in Venice, where fornicating couples were encouraged by the courts to get married. Even in cases of rape, the courts pressed for a settlement of the matter by marriage. Thus the protection and encouragement of marriage and the family had become a central concern of the Venetian state at least by 1450.

SIMILARLY, by 1400 the Venetian courts were becoming increasingly concerned about sodomy, which they began to treat as one of the most serious of all crimes, along with treason and heresy. It was now regarded as a crime against nature as well as a threat to the safety of the city, which was thought to be liable to suffer the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah. Two points stand out in this story. One is that the traditional view that the most vile and despicable of the two actors is the passive one had come to an end. Legal opinion had shifted sharply to the more modern attitude of blaming the sexual aggressor rather than his victim or accomplice. The second is the steady and startling rise of sodomy cases before the Venetian courts, from five to nearly 200 every 25 years from the mid-14th to the late 15th century. The more zealously the court investigated and prosecuted homosexuality, the more cases of sodomy they discovered. Ruggiero plausibly suggests that homosexuality and the repression of homosexuality go in waves, periods of indifference creating greater public exposure, and greater public exposure generating a backlash of fear and repression.

THE motor force behind the repression of the 16th century seems to have been new concepts of virtue and honor, now closely identified with marriage and the family. There was a powerful desire to repress, which cannot merely be attributed to the growing power of the Renaissance state to control the lives of its subjects. In any case, states, however powerful, usually have more important things to do than attempt to stamp out fornication and adultery. The 16th century was a period of destructive civil wars, declining real wages, rising population, and increased unemployment and vagrancy. All states attempted to cope with these problems by increasingly harsh measures to enforce law and order. But this hardly explains why the drive to order should be so fiercely concentrated on deviant sexuality, not only on sodomy, which almost everywhere was made a penal offense punishable by death, but also on premarital sex, fornication, concubinage, and adultery.

As Achillo Olivieri points out in an article in the Ariès volume, there nevertheless appeared a semi-submerged undercurrent of eroticism, especially in Italy, which ran directly counter to the general drift to sexual asceticism and repression. Aretino, for example, wrote defiantly in the mid-16th century: "a good pair of buttocks is possessed of greater power than all that has ever proceeded from philosophers, astrologers, alchemists and necromancers." Aretino's writings, and Guilio Romano's drawings and engravings of sexual postures, were almost the first works of pure eroticism or pornography in the West for over a thousand years. From Petronius to Aretino there was virtually nothing, as shown by the empty volume edited by Bruno Roy.

The Italian eroticism of the 16th century suggests that the repression was far from fully effective in confining the sexual drive to the narrow pathway of marriage. And yet, despite that late age of marriage, bastardy rates and pre-nuptial conception rates in the 17th century were surprisingly low; and homosexuality was largely confined, so far as the records go, to the nobility and courtiers in the major cities, who were largely immune from the law. Where did the libido go? Was it sublimated in religious zeal, or diverted into masturbation or the various forms of non-procreative sexual activity? We do not know, and probably never will. All that can be said with certainty is that in England, New England, and parts of France, there is clear evidence that the courting procedure among the lower classes included what was known in England and America as "bundling." This consisted of all-night sessions in which a courting couple were alone in the dark in a room with a bed, a practice carried out with at least the tacit consent and complicity of the adults. In the 17th century these all-night encounters do not seem to have resulted in a great deal of premarital pregnancies, to judge by the low rates of bastardy and pre-nuptial pregnancy.

IN THE 18th century the sexual life of the West took yet another turn. Most Protestant churches relaxed their previous tight grip on the sexual behavior of their congregations, although in Catholic areas the confession box remained an effective control device. In England, for example, official tracking down and prosecution of fornication by the church courts had ceased by the early 18th century, and partly as a result the proportion of all brides at their first marriage who were already pregnant rose to the astonishing figure of 50 percent. In 18th-century England, pregnancy clearly preceded and perhaps caused marriage rather than vice versa. This century also saw the first large-scale production and consumption of high-quality pornography, such as *Fanny Hill*, while homosexuality began once more to come out into the open, at any rate in the great conurbation of London, where homosexual clubs and alehouses sprang up. But public opinion was still officially hostile; those of the lower classes who thus flaunted their sexual preferences ran the risk of severe punishment. Only the upper classes, as usual, were left free to pursue their homosexual tastes with impunity.

A relatively novel philosophical prin-

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ciple of the age was that each individual possesses certain inalienable rights, although it was never finally settled just what those rights were. In accordance with this philosophy, one homosexual brought to trial in 1726 defiantly staked out a new claim to individual freedom: "I think there is no crime in making what use I please of my own body." It was to take another 250 years for so radical a notion to become generally accepted.

At the same time as there were these hints at greater tolerance, a strong countercurrent is also visible, shown by the extraordinary popularity of books denouncing the appalling moral and medical dangers of masturbation, a revival in a new form of the age-old belief that semen was a precious fluid to be husbanded with care. This anti-masturbation panic appears as something of an anomaly within the 18th-century sexual code. It was a panic that grew to hysterical proportions in the Victorian period, only to die away again in the 20th century. There were also other ways in which the 18th century displayed a continued modesty and even prudery in its sexual conduct. It is clear, for example, that couples almost never stripped naked in the 18th century in order to make love. Even honeymoon couples went to bed at night and got up again next morning dressed in a shirt and a smock, and there is evidence that they kept them on all night. Nor, in the hundreds of cases of sexual intercourse and foreplay recorded in detail in divorce court proceedings, is there more than the very occasional hint of the practice of oral sex. Even in the male fantasy world of pornography, it does not occur very frequently in the 18th century.

SEXUALITY in the 19th century is still much of a mystery. It combined what seems like the all-time pinnacle of hypocritical prudery and sexual asceticism, evidenced by a fairly widespread concept of women as sexless, domesticated childbearing machines, and a fanatical fear of masturbation that today seems altogether pathological. On the other hand, it is known that large numbers of the urban proletariat were living in casual concubinage, that a vast army of urban prostitutes and highly specialized brothels serviced all classes of men, and that some of the most elaborate and obscene pornography ever produced was circulating among a tiny minority of connoisseurs. At the same time the first major scientific inquiries into the medical and psychological aspects of sex were being launched. The identification of this "desire to know" as a central characteristic of 19th-century sexuality, culminating in the works of men as diverse as Havelock Ellis and Freud, was the key finding of the first volume of Michel Foucault's *History of Sexuality*.

The reasons for the most salient aspect of the 19th century, the evident attempts at sexual repression, are even more obscure than the facts of actual behavior. There was clearly a moral panic among the upper classes of Europe in the face of the threat posed to their status and positions by the ideas of equality emerging from the French Revolution. There was also a strong moral asceticism associated with evangelical religion. Finally, some suggest that a "spermatic economy" was a sexual ethic peculiarly appropriate to the acquisitive and retentive bourgeoisie of the Victorian era. But these are all very vague hypotheses that are extremely difficult to prove or disprove.

Today, in the late 20th century, the wheel of sexual morality has once more turned. We are living in a period of


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quite unprecedented sexual toleration, and of a sexualization of all aspects of everyday life from sea-bathing to the selling of automobiles. As Ariès rightly complains, "We see sex everywhere. Every cylinder is a phallus." Before now, sexual libertinism has been confined to narrow elite circles, often around a court. Its dissemination among a population at large, as has occurred in the last 20 years, is a phenomenon unique in the history of developed societies.

It may well not last much longer, in view of the deepening moral tangle about abortion, as medical technology makes the problem of what is and what is not a viable fetus a more and more unanswerable question; the rising tide of anti-pornographic feminism; and the steady expansion of "moral majoritarian" prudery and demands for sexual control. There is also growing public anxiety about the social consequences of the apparent disintegration of the traditional family, now that the divorce rate has reached 50 percent and the illegitimacy rate is creeping up close to 20 percent. The appearance of so far incurable new venereal diseases such as AIDS and herpes makes it impossible any longer to regard promiscuous sex as a cost-free and victimless form of entertainment. Larger and larger numbers of households are today composed of single persons, or pairs of diverse genders living together outside formal marriage. This is not a new phenomenon, but the scale on which it is now occurring and its spread to all social levels are certainly unprecedented. Whether these trends are temporary or permanent has yet to be seen, and the degree to which they are the cause of social instability and of maladjusted children is still unproven. What is certain is that these trends do not seem to be increasing the sum of human happiness, as was anticipated when the sexual revolution began in the 1960s. Sexual liberation is forging its own new chains.

DOVER, Veyne, Foucault, Boswell, Ariès, Ruggiero, Otis, Rossiaud, Flandrin, Degler, Gay, and others have at last revealed the outlines of the extraordinary and erratic history of changing attitudes to sexuality in the West since the fifth century B.C., and they have analyzed with skill the philosophical and religious systems that lay behind those changes. What is disappointing, however, is the extreme poverty of the explanations offered for the success of these great moral revolutions.

As a philosopher, Foucault is not interested in historical causation. For the late Roman revolution Veyne advanced a theory that it filled the psychological needs of a new self-disciplined imperial bureaucracy, which transformed the Roman senatorial class from machismo warlords into sexually ascetic clerks. Boswell, on the other hand, hinges his argument for the popularity of the new asceticism upon the capture of the failing empire by provincials and villagers bringing with them their rural sexual values intolerant of all forms of sexual deviance. This is quite plausible, especially with regard to homosexuality, which has always seemed to flourish best in an urban setting. The trouble is, however, that sexual asceticism is hardly a standard feature of rural life, and Boswell has no evidence whatever that it was so in late antiquity. Moreover, he abandons it, as he admits, when he comes to trying to explain the second, and even greater, repression of deviants that occurred in the 13th century. Since this period saw the apogee of the medieval urban economy and culture, he is unable to explain the repression by a new triumph of rural values. Instead he falls back on the rise of a bureaucratic and legalistic state, coupled with mounting xenophobia generated by the Crusades. But bureaucratic formalism and crusading zeal hardly seem

SUMMER NIGHTS

You took me to see your friend, a youngish man
  who lived in an iron lung and spoke
through a machine that made his voice
  sound underwater, his head propped
in such a way that I imagined it was
  unattached to what there was of his body.
In the summer of 1952 I lay awake
  in the hot, endless nights
with cars drifting listlessly
  down Chandler Boulevard, their lights
sliding the walls of my room and moving off

  into the desperately calm summer air.
On those nights I thought of your childhood,
  how the doctors wrapped your poor legs
with wool and tar, your mother bathing you
  through the plagued Chicago summer—
the smell of wet wool still makes you sick.
  In the night, as I awaited the morning
that could find my thin body motionless and locked,
  I listened with sentimental care
to my sister crying softly to herself

  in dream, you and our father talking
in a muffled way in your bedroom,
  the low, barely discernible static
of his transistor radio.
  It was as if in those airless rooms
there was no hope of surviving the night,
  that everything was endless and dark,
with sleep coming only with the lights
  of cars, the final victory of their lulling,
sure movement, drifting steadily awhile
  on the walls of my room, and passing on.

DANIEL HALPERN

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adequate to explain so major a transformation in moral attitudes and official action.

The same problem arises with the next wave of intolerant repression of all forms of deviation in the 16th century. Judaism, witchcraft, sodomy, prostitution, fornication, and all forms of nonprocreative marital sex came under vigorous attack. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation are clearly vitally important factors, but the drive against witchcraft began long before, around 1480, as did the drive against prostitution and sodomy. The rise of the Renaissance state hardly explains the obsessive concern with sexual morality. The social and economic upheavals of the 16th and 17th centuries obviously called for increased measures of social control, but not for hunting down and exterminating Jews, sodomites, or witches. The persecution of religious heretics can be explained by the Reformation, but not the drive for sexual austerity.

The next wave of sexual intolerance, beginning in the 1790s, can perhaps be attributed to moral panic caused by the French Revolution, evangelical religion, and the austere values of the rising bourgeoisie. These are all quite plausible; still, even taken together they are hardly convincing. As for the alternating waves of intolerance and indifference, there is as yet not even the suggestion of a causal model.

The intermittent ebbs and flows in the long history of the West of a passion for redefining the boundaries of the licit and the illicit in sexual life are one of the most baffling phenomena facing the social historian, the historian of ideas, and the historian of *mentalité*. Thanks to the meticulous research of many scholars, we now know the broad outlines of the facts. But the causal mechanisms still elude us. The characteristics that all these episodes of repression have in common is that they have usually included attacks on most forms of deviance, whether racial/religious (Jews or Arabs), or exclusively religious (heretics), or magical (witches), or occupational (usurers), or political (traitors), or sexual (homosexuals or fornicators). All are driven by moral panic, a great fear. Still, just what it is that triggers this group hysteria and what it is that calms it remain obscure. What is absolutely certain, however, is that over the long history of Western civilization, there has been no such thing as "normal sexuality." Sexuality is a cultural artifact that has undergone constant and sometimes dramatic changes over time, and there is every reason to suppose that there are still more surprising transformations in store for us in the not too distant future.

SHIA STOOPS TO CONQUER

All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran
by Gary Sick

(Random House, 366 pp., $19.95)

American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis
by Warren Christopher, Harold H. Saunders, et al.
A Council on Foreign Relations Book

(Yale University Press, 443 pp., $25)

When news of the hostage-taking reached Washington, Jimmy Carter responded with emotions similar to those of most of the American public. According to Harold H. Saunders, his assistant secretary of state in charge of Middle Eastern affairs, "President Carter in his initial reactions may simply have been acting as Jimmy Carter—an outraged and concerned American who happened to be President." The White House adviser on Iranian affairs, Captain Gary Sick, notes that a similar reaction was widespread in the government. "When President Carter said, as he did on many different occasions both publicly and privately, that the fate of the hostages was on his mind at every

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waking moment, he was . . . expressing what was a daily reality for almost all of us who were caught up in the crisis." Sick then relates his own reaction:

> I remember discussing the crisis with my family shortly after the hostages were seized and telling them until the hostages were freed, their welfare would take priority over everything else in my life. It was almost like taking religious vows, and that sense of personal dedication remained vivid and strong until the Algerian plane carried the hostages safely out of Iranian airspace many months later.

WHEN these men say that for 14 and a half months, from November 4, 1979, until the very last moments of the Carter presidency on January 20, 1981, the issue of the American captives in Iran dominated the Carter administration's concerns, they are admitting to one of the most bizarre developments in the history of American government. That the president of the United States, the chief executive of the federal government, the commander in chief of the military forces, the head of the Democratic Party, and the leader of the free world devoted his "every waking moment" to the fate of 52 persons almost defies belief. It is only somewhat less preposterous that for 444 days the president's specialist on Iran concentrated with near-religious intensity on the welfare of the hostages, to the detriment of all other issues connected with Iran—the rebellions that threatened the central government, the tripling of the price of oil, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraqi invasion.

The United States paid in many ways for the emotionalism of its leaders, as these two books indicate. American government officials devoted so much time to this issue that their attention to matters of greater significance was much reduced. "As the agenda for dealing with the hostage crisis jelled," Mr. Saunders notes, "other important issues were gradually crowded off the agendas of each of the principals involved." For almost a year, a large portion of the cabinet met almost every day to keep up with developments in Iran, the president frequently joining them. Warren Christopher, Carter's deputy secretary of state and the official in charge of the final negotiations, estimates that

> as many as ten of the most important officials in the executive branch were diverted each day from their other duties for one to two hours or more. . . . Take two hours out of the morning of the most important Cabinet secretaries to meet on an almost daily basis on any specific problem, and you will see a government so highly focused on that issue that other issues may be neglected.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, just eight weeks after the embassy occupation, can be attributed at least in part to Moscow's realization that American fury toward Iran would prevent any cooperation against its forces. Obsession with the hostages diminished scrutiny of Soviet actions; Mr. Saunders observes that "much later, Secretary Vance would wonder whether sharper warnings to the Soviet Union before the invasion might have headed it off—warnings that were not given because of our absorbing immersion in the hostage crisis."

Even after the Soviets invaded, the president and other top officials continued to allow their attention be diverted by the 52. For example, on January 4, 1980, a week after the Soviet assault, a day after President Carter recognized this as "the most serious international development that has occurred since I have been president," and a moment when response to Moscow was urgent—even then the president interrupted everything else to hear a petty accounting of "several conversations with significant international figures who had been in and out of Tehran."

The hostage issue may have spurred the Soviet invasion in another way. Relations with the allies suffered because other governments, unable to fathom the American obsession, were reluctant to isolate Iran in accordance with Washington's insistence. Not only did the United States isolate itself in the process, but cooperation on other issues—such as Soviet aggression—was much weakened. The result was American anger, allied resentment, Iranian derision, and Soviet delight.

IF ALLIES were alienated, enemies came closer. The desperate search for an intermediary with the ayatollah led Washington to ask favors of, and obligate itself to, the Palestine Liberation Organization. Principles were eroded: enraged with Iran, the president blocked its presence at the United Nations. In so doing, he reversed a permanent rule of American policy, which is always to allow member states the opportunity to discuss their grievances before the Security Council. Ironically, absorption with the hostages interfered even with ending their captivity. The faction holding them profited immeasurably in Iranian politics from the fact that their actions induced a crisis in the United States. Also, unquenchable American media interest undoubtedly spurred the embassy occupiers to stay in the spotlight.

In Washington, overemphasis pushed American officials in wrong directions. "One of the consequences of this intense personal commitment," writes Gary Sick, "was a strong impulse to *do something*, almost as if action was a necessary end in itself." As the Americans tried ever more fanciful and hysterical expedients, they broadcast ever more clearly that the Iranians, in Jimmy Carter's words, "have us by the balls." Writing years later, Sick acknowledges that "doing nothing was in fact the wisest course of action."

TOO MUCH media fascination at least twice obstructed a resolution. On one occasion, it spoiled the unique chance for American emissaries to go to Iran. NBC News got wind of the travel plans and made these known, inducing Khomeini to reject the American mission even before it arrived. On another occasion, President Carter confided to the families of hostages his threat to disrupt Iranian commerce if the hostages were put on trial, only to find this information the next morning in *The New York Times*.

Hostage mania entailed more abstract costs, too. Government behavior led to a national sense of humiliation, confusion, and weakness. It also caused international disrespect for the United States, reducing the country's reputation and influence. Worse, the American response helped those forces most antagonistic to the United States win full control of the government in Tehran. In all these ways, Washington's hysteria harmed the United States much more than did developments in Iran.

Why this extreme perversion of priorities? These two accounts point to a number of factors. First, most of the hostages were State Department employees. Gary Sick observes that "to Washington policy makers, the hostages were not just abstractions: in many cases they were friends." Officials felt a personal responsibility to the hostages and therefore devoted disproportionate energies to their release.

Second, being friends helped the hostages' families win unprecedented priv-

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ileges. They had daily access to members of the Iran Working Group at the State Department, and a "family branch" of the working group kept the families continuously informed. Unlike the Vietnam prisoner of war families—provincials without connections in high places who could hardly get a hearing—the hostage families' organization, FLAG, received office space right by the crisis center in the State Department. The families met early and often with the secretary of state and the president, the first discussion with Carter taking place just four days after the embassy takeover. Several hostages' wives met with heads of government and heads of state during a trip they took to Europe.

THIRD, the situation was such that government officials could easily empathize with the victims. Passengers of a single downed Korean passenger jet receive more attention than tens of thousands of Afghan peasants because Americans can picture themselves sitting in a 747, but not in an Afghan village; similarly, fellow bureaucrats can imagine themselves in an embassy surrounded by violent hordes.

Fourth, Iranian actions had a particularly humiliating quality. The violation of old and sanctified diplomatic practice guaranteed strong responses, especially among diplomats. This explains why Warren Christopher describes the embassy occupation as an act of "extraordinary repugnance." Though relatively nonviolent, Iranian behavior disdained cherished norms in a manner calculated to provoke outrage.

Fifth, as Saunders notes, "What the president faced daily from the media, from the Congress, and from the public at large was an angrily insistent, 'Why aren't you doing something?' " As a politician, he felt compelled to respond.

Sixth, the presidential primary campaign was just getting started (both Edward Kennedy and Jerry Brown declared their candidacies the week of the hostage-taking), and Jimmy Carter did not want to miss an occasion to display his leadership abilities. Harold Saunders delicately phrases the opportunity this way:

> Politically, for a President under challenge by Senator Kennedy for leadership of his party, it must have seemed virtually unthinkable to try to put such a problem on the back burner. Americans do not respond warmly to a leader who coldly stacks up human lives against some rational calculation of "national interest."

Seventh, opposition candidates picked up the hostage issue and made it a central theme of the presidential campaign. Republicans in general, and Ronald Reagan in particular, rode hard the hostage indignity for the benefits it offered.

Finally, winning international attention for the hostages was seen (mistakenly) as a way to keep pressure on Iran. American officials "felt it was important to deny the Iranians the option of ignoring their obligations to release the Americans being held." Keeping the issue prominent was used to prevent the Iranians from avoiding a decision. Saunders reveals that, "in the hostage crisis, the test for a lot of us became whether we could outlast the Iranians." Cyrus Vance suggests in his memoirs that "the glare of publicity may have helped to save [the hostages'] lives." This misguided sense of strategy, together with the other influences at work, combined to make every official dealing with Iran exaggerate the importance of the hostages. *Every one*: Sick writes that no significant voice in the government argued for lessening the emphasis.

But, despicable as the hostage seizure was, the president had no right to respond "as an outraged and concerned American who happened to be President." Government officials have an obligation to keep their wits. How-

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ever dry it may seem to the public, the "rational calculation of 'national interest' " is the president's duty. Like a doctor, he must steel himself against individual pain or he loses his efficacy. A state, especially a great power, cannot make foreign policy on the basis of the interests of a handful of individuals.

The Carter administration immediately adopted as its goal the freeing of the hostages, without considering other factors. It ignored the costs of confronting Iran with regard to relations with the allies, the situation in Afghanistan, or the oil market. It paid little attention to the internal politics of Iran and apparently never anticipated the problems of massive press coverage or too-close consultation with the captives' families.

SEVERAL lessons emerge from this American experience. The less press attention a hostage drama receives, the easier it is for the government to handle it. Keeping the hostage affair out of the news is not, of course, a government decision, but its efforts to lessen the media's obsession with an issue can do much in this regard. If it wishes to avoid headlines, the White House must stay completely away. Had President Carter kept aloof from the issue and relegated discussion of the hostages to the Department of State spokesman, the press might have lost interest.

President Carter eventually realized this point. In April 1980 he announced a more normal schedule of activities, hoping this "might contribute to an expeditious decision by the Iranian parliament to release the Americans." Secretary of State Vance also recognized that "it was a mistake for us not to have played down the crisis as much as possible." Families of hostages should have been kept away from officials. By meeting the families, leaders cultivated personal bonds that obstructed the objective consideration of larger issues.

Finally, the United States should have responded to the hostage-taking with a policy of deterrence. As Gary Sick puts it:

> Declare that any physical harm to the hostages would result in severe punishment to Iran, but that the onus for securing the release of the hostages fell exclusively on Iran and its leaders: in the meantime, the United States had other important business to attend to and did not intend to let itself be tied in knots by the illegal activities of a band of extremists.

Implicit in Sick's approach is the correct assumption that preventing an opponent from adopting a new measure is easier than changing a measure already taken. In the case of hostage-taking, he advises, the U.S. government should concentrate on preventing future steps, not undoing past ones. His words ought to be inscribed on a great block of marble and placed in the lobby of the State Department.

AT THIS WRITING, two groups of Americans are held captive by Lebanese friends of the Iranian government, seven men abducted off the streets of Beirut as long as 15 months ago and around 42 passengers on a hijacked TWA airplane. The lessons of Tehran apply to both these groups. American officials must suppress emotional reactions, remain coolly aware of the effects of their statements and actions, and keep the interests of the whole nation firmly in view. The issue of a specific American response is not to be discussed publicly, while the terrorists should be informed that harm done to captives will bring certain retaliation.

Such a policy, however, faces two problems. First, threats do not intimidate suicide squads, and some Lebanese terrorists seem to be so highly motivated they either do not fear death or they welcome it. Fortunately, these appear to be few in number. Reports from Lebanon indicate that, for the time being anyway, their ranks may be depleted. At this point, the Americans' captors are probably susceptible to conventional pressures. Second, the United States government has uttered many ferocious words but nothing more. Inaction has undercut Secretary of State George P. Shultz's frequent and forceful calls for reprisals. By now, words have no further utility. Seriousness about protecting American citizens can be proven only with deeds.

As indicated by his sound advice, Gary Sick recognizes the mistakes of the past and has learned from them. Of the three writers under consideration, he alone profited intellectually from the 1979-81 experience. Harold Saunders halfheartedly defends the Carter administration's actions by acknowledging the validity of criticisms while pointing out that the person on the spot must act quickly and responsibly. In effect, he pleads the press of events as an excuse for mistakes.

In contrast, Warren Christopher stoutly defends American policy. But the former deputy secretary of state's efforts are undercut by his limited grasp of the issues. He was so deeply involved in the American dimension of the problem that he lost sight of—or never understood—two critical facts: that the hostage-taking was primarily an event in the conflict between rival factions over control of the Iranian government, and that the Americans were let go when the radical faction won and had no more use for them.

Unaware of these matters, Christopher misjudges the consequences of the hostage-taking. He believes that "the professed aims of the embassy occupiers went unrealized," and that the drama was "a long-running ordeal that would cost Iran dearly." He draws exactly the wrong conclusions: "There is scant incentive for others to copy the Iranian action in the future" and "The hostage crisis was as much Iran's quagmire as it was ours."

Oblivious to the real reason for the hostages' release, Christopher indulges his vanity with the notion that it was American eloquence that ended the affair; it was "the force of our arguments . . . that ultimately prevailed." Worse, he sees the outcome as a victory for the United States and a model for future confrontations. "We should take the crisis as a clear vindication of talking as a means to resolve international disputes"—showing that the same people who argue that "force does not work" wish to transform failure into victory. (Also, despite his advocacy of negotiations, Christopher does admit using President-elect Ronald Reagan's "blunt language . . . as an added incentive for the Iranians to come to terms.")

Sick's book is wise, even profound. Saunders has written a bureaucrat's apology. And, understanding little about American policy and less about Iran, Christopher in his essay precisely embodies the weaknesses of the Carter administration.

DANIEL PIPES

Daniel Pipes, associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, formerly served on the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.

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INNOCENT ABROAD

Stars and Bars
by William Boyd

(William Morrow Co., 334 pp., $16.95)

The deepest hatreds grow in families, and few family ties have spawned as many and as complex varieties of dislike as the uneasy, half-illegitimate bonds that bind America to Britain. Britons routinely—and volubly—find visiting Americans uncouth, half-educated, and arrogant, while Americans consider English tourists aloof, condescending, and maddeningly incurious. Of all British travelers, the most routinely offensive are the literary ones (who may, like the Naipaul brothers, be only honorary Britons). Since the time of Dickens, this tribe has made an industry of converting two weeks in the United States into book-length denunciations of American manners, morals, and hygiene.

William Boyd, the author of *A Good Man in Africa* and *An Ice-Cream War*, has approached the New World with—dare I say it?—un-British humility. The result is an uneven but rewarding comic novel. The theme of *Stars and Bars* is one the two sides never grow tired of discussing in private: What is the difference not between our two political systems or societies but between our characters, our very selves? Henderson Dores, Boyd's appealingly klutzy central character, has made his judgment: Englishmen are shy, Americans are bold, and Henderson wants to become an American.

Henderson isn't unintelligent, unsuccessful, or even unattractive; he is nearly 40 and just under six feet tall. "His frame is sturdy and his face is kind and agreeably attractive. To his constant surprise, people are inclined to like him on first acquaintance."

But Henderson is paralyzingly timid—so timid that he has ruined his dream marriage to an American girl because he couldn't bring himself to tell the unattractive next-door neighbor that he didn't want to go to bed with her. Now, after some solitary years as a Grub Street art critic in London, Henderson has left England and come to New York in a "deliberate flight from shyness, in a determined escape from timidity." Henderson expects America to make him a new man: "here, shyness was banned; shyness was outlawed, prohibited."

America thrills and intimidates him ("those drawls, those impossible names, the real gun on the real cop's hip"). He admires the people, "the crowds of Americans—neat, well dressed—strid[ing] past him purposefully, unheeding, confident." And he tries his modest, self-deprecating best to blend in, taking an apartment in the East, studying Zen fencing with a black swordsman named Eugene Teagarden, and entering into an uneasy liaison with Irene Stein, a New York bitch goddess who captivates him at a gallery opening by remarking, "I'm not the fucking hatcheck, numbnuts."

But try as he will, Henderson just can't get into the swing of things. Waiters introduce themselves in restaurants, then seem offended when Henderson stands and introduces the members of his party. He is puzzled by New York menus: *crevettes fumées aux framboises*, filet mignon with butterscotch sauce, salsify, fenugreek, gingerroot, braised radishes, fillet of hake in lager and cranberry sauce. He can't tell the ordinary citizens from the muggers, he can't sleep, and his coworkers open conversations like this:

> "How would you react, Henderson, if I said . . . if I said that the one word I associate with you is 'hostel'?"
>
> "Hostel?" His mind raced. "As in 'youth hostel'?"
>
> "No, for God's sake, As in 'hostel aircraft,' 'hostel country,' as in 'The Soviets are hostel to American policy.' "
>
> "Oh. Got you. We say 'style.' 'Hostyle.' "
>
> "Why do you hate me, Henderson? Why do I sense this incredible aggression coming from you?"

Then the art auction firm he works for gets a call from a Southern millionaire who wants to sell a collection of Impressionist paintings, and Henderson is packed unwilling off to the land of cotton. In a moss-grown backwater named Luxora Beach, not far from Atlanta, he is subjected to the tender mercies of the Gage family: Loomis, the old millionaire who remembers "Hem" and "Scott" from Paris, but who's recently become a vegetarian so as not to offend his housekeeper; Cora, a medical school dropout who feigns blindness and introduces herself by saying, "I have an illogical but profound dislike of the English"; Beckman, the down-home particle-physicist who can't stop blinking, or talking about his days in Vietnam; and Freeborn, who rather clouds Henderson's welcome by remarking, ". . . if you don't get your fuckin' ass out of this house by noon tomorrow I'm going to bust your fuckin' head with it."

What happens thereafter is, as in all good comic fiction, at once intricate and trivial. But before it's over, Henderson has been nauseated by Southern cooking, humiliated in an Atlanta hotel, rejected by Irene, and threatened graphically by Mafia dons. As we half expected, he comes through it all beautifully, until he reaches the moment when, robbed of his clothes, he must wander the predawn streets of New York dressed only in a sanitary napkin packing case. As the first rays of sun touch his half-naked form, Henderson, for perhaps the first time in his life, feels accepted: "Just another fucking weirdo. It was a moment of true liberation. A revelation. He felt all the restraints of his culture and upbringing fall from him like a cloak slid from shoulders. He felt . . . spontaneously, unusually pure."

All comedy, of course, takes as its subject the integration of the individual into a society that is at least half-mad. So Henderson's epiphany is exhilarating for the reader as well, a fitting close for a drama of transatlantic identity crisis. But a good deal of *Stars and Bars* isn't up to that mark. Boyd's view of smart New York life is precise if not entirely original. His satire of Atlanta ("Where is everybody?" asks his traveling companion when they hit Peachtree Street. "It's like being in the future") is

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fresh and hilarious. My favorite moment comes when Henderson checks into a mammoth downtown hotel called the Monopark, then finds that to reach his room he must paddle a canoe across the moat in the atrium.

But much of the Southern comedy isn't really up to its setting. For one thing, it is very hard to write a comedy of manners about a group of eccentrics. Boyd evidently means us to take the Gages as a nearly incredible gang of zanies; in fact, by Dixie eccentric standards, they're rank amateurs, and they never quite pull off a memorable slapstick scene. Second, Boyd gets a few details just plain wrong. I don't mean factual mistakes, which don't really matter in comic fiction, but errors of manners, which do: for example, T. J. Cardew, the preacher whose parishioners call him "Father" and who serenely drinks sour-mash whiskey, was plainly created by someone who hasn't spent much time with Southern Baptists.

So in the middle of this book, the laughs are few and far between. Its beginning and ending, however, are just shy (so to speak) of brilliant. And *Stars and Bars* is oddly good-natured in its satire, which is unusual for comic fiction and even more unusual for transatlantic raillery. I hope Boyd will venture South again someday. Unlike many English writers, he seems like a good guest, one who would make his bed, tidy up, and do his best to fit in with native ways. He's even sent America a gracious thank-you note.

GARRETT EPPS

Garrett Epps is associate editor of Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill. His novel, *The Floating Island: A Tale of Washington*, was published in May by Houghton Mifflin.

CORRESPONDENCE, *from page 6*

used the word "nigger" to refer to blacks.

Likewise, for each of the other arguments Newfield makes against Koch there is a fuller, more complex story that Newfield doesn't present. Those of your readers who do not live in New York may now perhaps understand how the radical left's Hate Koch Campaign works. Since I have not read Roger Starr's book, I have no idea what Newfield did to him.

WILLIAM A. BAKER
New York, New York

THE NEW REPUBLIC'S BEST BOOKS

Following is a list of books TNR *has recently reviewed and recommends.*

Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in 19th-Century England by Louis Crompton (University of California Press). A revealing chapter in the history of intolerance. (Reviewed 7/1/85)

Lives of the Saints by Nancy Lemann (Knopf). Coming of age in a daze in New Orleans. (6/24/85)

Slow Homecoming by Peter Handke, translated by Ralph Manheim (Farrar, Straus & Giroux). Three metaphoric and metaphysical parables. (6/17/85)

Irving Babbitt: An Intellectual Study by Thomas E. Nevin (The University of North Carolina Press). An intellectual biography of humanism's stern champion. (6/17/85)

Acts of Will: The Life and Work of Otto Rank by E. James Lieberman M.D. (Free Press). Another chapter in the history of psychoanalysis. (5/20/85)

Women and Angels by Harold Brodkey (The Jewish Publication Society of America). Two ordinary fragments of a long-awaited novel, and a third remarkable one: the portrait of a revelation. (5/20/85)

The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age by Walter A. McDougall (Basic). The story of the state, the scientists, and the exploitation of the galaxy. (6/3/85)

The Call: An American Missionary in China by John Hersey (Knopf). An unsentimental saga of one Christian's half-century in China. (5/13/85)

The Kindness of Strangers: The Life of Tennessee Williams by Donald Spoto (Little, Brown). A thorough life of the carousing playwright. (5/13/85)

Home Truths: Sixteen Stories by Mavis Gallant (Random House). Portraits of Canadians at home and abroad. (5/13/85)

TRB, *from page 4*

the plan has "a bias toward the traditional family built into it," meaning the family with two parents, one of them at home with the kids.

This is government social engineering, of the sort Reaganites are supposed to eschew in general and especially when done through the tax code. Using the power of the central government to put pressure on the states is another departure from ostensible Reaganite principles. Cuomo and company are right, furthermore, that different states bear varying shares of what are, by rights, national burdens. If Reagan were prepared to nationalize welfare costs, as he should, he would be in a better position to insist that state governments give up the federal subsidy for whatever tax burden they choose to impose.

But if we restore the state and local deduction, where will the money come from to pay for it? Overall, Reagan's plan gives its biggest benefits, as usual, to people in the top brackets. Although the largest percentage cuts go to the working poor, the largest dollar amounts of savings go to the rich. Taxes on the working poor have been rising throughout Reagan's tenure; this reform puts them about where they were in the late 1970s. For the rich, it's a tax cut on top of several others. For this reason, and because they will benefit disproportionately from restoring the deduction, high-income people should supply the lost revenue.

It's not necessary to raise Reagan's top rate of 35 percent to achieve this. Even after Reagan's reform, the tax code remains full of loopholes that haven't been touched. One of my favorites, which has yet to surface in the current debate, concerns inherited property. When property passes by inheritance, no capital gains tax is paid on profits during the descendant's lifetime. The recipient measures his gain from the moment he inherited. This obscure loophole will cost the government six billion dollars in 1990, almost all for the benefit of the very rich. And this is entirely apart from Reagan's gutting of the estate tax. Reagan's own 1986 budget reports that Reagan-era estate-tax cuts will cost the government nine billion dollars in 1988, while what's left of the tax will bring in barely half that amount.

That's just one of many. Six billion here, six billion there, and pretty soon you're talking real money.

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Conniptions

ABBIE HOFFMAN or Jerry Rubin, I forget which, once said that getting indicted as one of the Chicago Seven was the Academy Award of protest. By extension (given today's reduced expectations), getting attacked in *Contentions* is the Emmy of liberalism. *Contentions*—or *Conniptions*, as Michael Kinsley has unforgettably renamed it—is the monthly (except August) newsletter of the Committee for the Free World. Although its circulation is small, its ideological authoritativeness is absolute. A complete file is kept under sterile conditions at the National Bureau of Standards, where it is used to measure the purity of other neoconservative objects. Anyway, half of the June issue of *Contentions* is devoted to an attack on . . . me! Well, not really, just on a *New Republic* article I wrote about Vietnam ("Why the War Was Immoral," April 29). Still, I'm deeply honored.

THE AUTHOR of the attack, Midge Decter, executive director of the Committee for the Free World, paraphrases my argument quite fairly before calling it—*mot juste*—"smarty-pants." Apropos of my boast that I was "reared on Orwell, Gandhi, and Silone," she adds this footnote: "A curious, if not altogether unfamiliar, tradition, considering the contempt expressed by one of its component influences, Orwell, for another, Gandhi." That wasn't how I remembered Orwell's 1949 essay, "Reflections on Gandhi," so I went back and reread it. It's got plenty of criticism in it, yes, but its tone is strikingly respectful. Orwell finds that Gandhi's "otherworldly" ideas, which "make sense only on the assumption that God exists," cannot be squared with Orwell's own secular humanism. He deplores Gandhi's ideal of "non-attachment" because it seems to rule out preferential love for particular people. And he thinks that "Gandhi, who after all was born in 1869, did not understand the nature of totalitarianism and saw everything in terms of his own struggle against the British government." But Orwell also praises Gandhi's physical courage, his intellectual honesty, his readiness to tackle the "awkward questions" that most Western pacifists "specialize in avoiding." Here are the last three sentences of this wonderful essay: "And if, as may happen, India and Britain finally settle down into a decent and friendly relationship, will this be partly because Gandhi, by keeping up his struggle obstinately and without hatred, disinfected the political air? That one even thinks of asking such questions indicates his stature. One may feel, as I do, a sort of aesthetic distaste for Gandhi, one may reject the claims of sainthood made on his behalf (he never made any such claim himself, by the way), one may also reject sainthood as an ideal and therefore feel that Gandhi's basic aims were anti-human and reactionary: but regarded simply as a politician, and compared with the other leading political figures of our time, how clean a smell he has managed to leave behind!" This is contempt? On the contrary, one of the lessons Orwell holds for the neoconservatives, who have tried so hard to appropriate him (the book-publishing arm of the Committee for the Free World is called the Orwell Press), is that it is possible to disagree with someone—even to make fun of someone—*without* descending to expressions of contempt.

THE AMAZING SAGA of Lew Lehrman continues. At 47 he has been successively scholar (Harkness Fellow at Yale, Woodrow Wilson Fellow at Harvard); mogul (inheriting a chain of drugstores prophetically named Rite-Aid, he took the company public for big bucks); patron of scholarship (he founded the Lehrman Institute, a highly respectable, beautifully appointed think tank on the Upper East Side of New York); politician (he was the Republican candidate for governor of New York in 1982); lobbyist (he founded and heads Citizens for America, a Reaganite version of Common Cause); and prominent Catholic layman (he recently converted from Judaism, prompting his sister, a Mormon, to commend him for taking a step in the right direction). His gaunt face, intense gaze, and fabulous suspenders make him look a little like Buckaroo Banzai, whose career his own resembles. Now Lehrman has surfaced in the trackless jungles of Angola in a new role: guerrilla leader. Here he is in *Newsweek*, striding purposefully toward the camera, surrounded by insurgent fighters from Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Laos, who may be a little bewildered but who are pretty sure about one thing: they had best indulge this Lehrman fellow if they want to keep the checks coming. At a mass rally Lehrman reads aloud a letter from Reagan: "Struggle . . . risk . . . rights . . . goals." This latest Lehrman brainstorm is one more illustration of how thoroughly the New Right has usurped the territory once occupied by the New Left. Fifteen years ago it was New Leftists who journeyed to distant jungles to talk of "struggle" and moon over dashing guerrillas. Now it's the right. And it's not just the romanticism they've picked up; it's the naïveté, too.

ALFONSO ROBELO, a leading civilian spokesman for the Nicaraguan *contras*, gave a speech here over the weekend at the convention of Social Democrats, USA, and a very good speech it was, too. Robelo deplored "mere anti-Communism." He pointed out that when U.S. policy embraced authoritarian dictators such as Batista and Somoza "it gradually lost its moral and political foundation." He identified himself with the ideas of the democratic left. But what would happen if the *contras* were actually to win in Nicaragua? Once the *contra* army occupied Managua, its Somocista officers—there are only a few, we are constantly told, yet somehow they are never dispensed with—would most likely get on with the business of rounding up and executing Sandinistas and other *subversivos*. I doubt that people like Robelo and Arturo Cruz would last very long under the actual circumstances of a *contra* victory. In these situations the people with the guns tend to call the shots. The American right understood this very well when the people with the guns were the Vietcong and the sincere, moderate civilian spokesmen were people like Truong Nhu Tang, the justice minister in the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam who has since fled to exile. Now it is American conservatives who long to believe. Lew Lehrman is their Jane Fonda.

H.H.

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Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

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10 mg "tar," 0.7 mg nicotine
av. per cigarette, FTC Report Feb.'85.

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